Ex-Bataan vs Laguesma (LABOR LAW)

 Ex-Bataan Veterans Security Agency, Inc. vs The Secretary of Labor Laguesma

GR No. 152396 

November 20, 2007

Facts:

EBVSAI is in the business of providing security services while respondents are EBVSAI employees assigned to the Napocor, Ambuklao, Benguet. Private respondents instituted a complaint for underpayment of wages against EBVSAI before the Regional Office of DOLE. The Regional Office conducted a complaint inspection at the Ambuklao Plant where they observed violations of labor standards law. On the same date, the Regional Office issued a notice of hearing. The Regional Director then issued a compliance order. EBVSAI filed a motion for reconsideration and alleged that the Regional Director does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the money claim of each respondent exceeded P5,000.00. The Regional Director denied EBVSAI’s motion. EBVSAI appealed to the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of the Regional Director with modification. EBVSAI filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the Secretary of Labor.

           

Issue:

Did Regional Director acquire jurisdiction considering that notice was served at the plant and not at its main office and that it was addressed to its Vice President?

 

Held:

The Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices state that notices and copies of orders shall be served on the parties or their duly authorized representatives at their last known address or, if they are represented by counsel, through the latter. The rules shall be liberally construed and only in the absence of any applicable provision will the Rules of Court apply in a suppletory character. In this case, EBVSAI does not deny having received the notices of hearing. EBVSAI can no longer question the jurisdiction of the Regional Director after receiving the notices of hearing and after appearing before the Regional Director.

Republic vs Bagtas (Credit Transactions-commodatum)

Republic vs Bagtas

6 SCRA 262

Facts: 

Bagtas borrowed three bulls from the Bureau of Animal Industry for one year for breeding purposes subject to payment of breeding fee of 10% of book value of the bull. Upon expiration, Bagtas asked for renewal. The renewal was granted only to one bull. Bagtas offered to buy the bulls at its book value less depreciation but the Bureau refused. The Bureau said that Bagtas should either return or buy it at book value. Bagtas proved that he already returned two of the bulls, and the other bull died during a Huk raid, hence, obligation already extinguished. He claims that the contract is a commodatum hence, loss through fortuitous event should be borne by the owner.

 

Issue: 

WON Bagtas is liable for the death of the bull.

Held: 

Yes. Commodatum is essentially gratuitous. However, in this case, there is a 10% charge. If this is considered compensation, then the case at bar is a lease. Lessee is liable as possessor in bad faith because the period already lapsed.

Even if this is a commodatum, Bagtas is still liable because the fortuitous event happened when he held the bull and the period stipulated already expired and he is liable because the thing loaned was delivered with appraisal of value and there was no contrary stipulation regarding his liability in case there is a fortuitous event.

PAL vs CA (NIL)

PAL vs CA

GR No. 49188, January 30, 1990

Facts:

 The petition involved the alias writ of execution when respondent Amelia Tan commenced a complaint for damages against PAL, which CDI Manila rendered a decision in her favor.

The CA affirmed the decision with modification that PAL shall pay Tan P25,000.00 as damages and P5,000.00 as attorney's fee, with costs. The case was remanded to the trial court for execution and Tan filed a motion praying for the issuance of a writ of execution of the judgment rendered by the CA. Four months later, Tan moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution stating that the judgment rendered by the lower court, and affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, remained unsatisfied. In opposition, PAL countered that it already fully paid its obligation to Tan through the deputy sheriff of the respondent court, Emilio Z. Reyes, as evidenced by cash vouchers properly signed and receipted by said sheriff who had absconded.

 

Issues:

(1.)   Whether or not the payment made to the absconding sheriff by check in his name did operate to satisfy the judgment debt.

(2.) Whether or not such payments extinguish the judgment debt.

 

Held:

 (1.) No, the Court disagrees that the payment made to the absconding sheriff by check in his name operates to satisfy the judgment debt. In general, a payment, in order to be effective to discharge an obligation, must be made to the proper person. Article 1240 of the Civil Code provides that “Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it.” In the instant case, because PAL did not issue the checks intended for her, in her name, but to the absconding sheriff, such payment did not extinguish the judgment debt.

 (2.) No, the Court rules that the acceptance by the sheriff of the petitioner's checks, in the case at bar, does not, per se, operate as a discharge of the judgment debt.

Article 1249 of the Civil Code provides: The payment of debts in money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it is not possible to deliver such currency, then in the currency which is legal tender in the Philippines. The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile documents shall produce the effect of payment only when they have been cashed, or when through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired. In the meantime, the action derived from the original obligation shall be held in abeyance. Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment. A check, whether a manager's check or ordinary cheek, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. Mere delivery of checks does not discharge the obligation under a judgment. The obligation is not extinguished and remains suspended until the payment by commercial document is actually realized. Thus, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.