Cayat vs COMELEC (Election Laws)

Cayat vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 163776

April 24, 2007

FACTS:

Father Nardo Cayat and Thomas Palileng are the only mayoralty candidates for the May 2004 elections in Buguias Benguet. Palileng filed a petition for cancellation of the COC of Cayat on the ground of misrepresentation. Palileng argues that Cayat misrepresents himself when he declared in his COC that he is eligible to run as mayor when in fact he is not because he is serving probation after being convicted for the offense of acts of lasciviousness. Comelec, granted the petition of Palileng and Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration. Such, MR was denied because Cayat failed to pay the filing fee and hence, it was declared final and executory. Despite this decision, Cayat was still proclaimed as the winner and Palileng filed a petition for annulment of proclamation. Comelec declared Palileng as the duly elected mayor and Feliseo Bayacsan as the duly elected vice mayor. Bayacsan argues that he should be declared as mayor because of the doctrine of rejection of second placer.

 

ISSUE:

WON the rejection of second placer doctrine is applicable.

 

HELD:

The doctrine cannot be applied in this case because the disqualification of Cayat became final and executory before the elections and hence, there is only one candidate to speak of. The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. As such, Palileng is the only candidate and the duly elected mayor. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’s favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: 

(1) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and 

(2) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification became final only after the elections.

Labo vs COMELEC (Election Laws)

Labo Jr. vs COMELEC and Lardizabal

G.R. No. 86564

August 1, 1989

Facts:

Petitioner Labo was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City. Private respondent Lardizabal, the losing candidate, filed a petition for quo warranto questioning petitioner’s citizenship. The latter claims that petitioner is a naturalized Australian citizen, having married an Australian citizen. Records also showed petitioner’s oath and affirmation of allegiance to the Queen of Australia. These were not denied; petitioner however claimed that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship and that his naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous.

Issue:

Is the petitioner a Filipino citizen?

Ruling:

NO. CA No. 63 enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. All of which are applicable to the petitioner. In connection with this, Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution provides that, “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”

Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.

Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725, providing that:

… (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to public office.

Frivaldo vs COMELEC (Election Laws)

Frivaldo vs COMELEC

174 SCRA 245

(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification for Public Office)

Facts: 

Petitioner was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988. On October 27, 1988, respondents filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of petitioner’s election and proclamation on the ground that he was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor.

Petitioner insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an American citizen was not “impressed with voluntariness.” His oath in his COC that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the US, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified for public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure of this defect because the electorate could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code and the Omnibus Election Code.

Issue: 

Whether or not petitioner was qualified to run for public office.

Held: 

No. First, petitioner’s loss of his naturalized American citizenship did not and could not have the effect of automatic restoration of his Philippine citizenship.

Second, the mere filing of COC wherein petitioner claimed that he is a natural born Filipino citizen, is not a sufficient act of repatriation.

Third, qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed  not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.