Frivaldo vs COMELEC (Election Laws)

Frivaldo vs COMELEC

174 SCRA 245

(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification for Public Office)

Facts: 

Petitioner was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988. On October 27, 1988, respondents filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of petitioner’s election and proclamation on the ground that he was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor.

Petitioner insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an American citizen was not “impressed with voluntariness.” His oath in his COC that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the US, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified for public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure of this defect because the electorate could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code and the Omnibus Election Code.

Issue: 

Whether or not petitioner was qualified to run for public office.

Held: 

No. First, petitioner’s loss of his naturalized American citizenship did not and could not have the effect of automatic restoration of his Philippine citizenship.

Second, the mere filing of COC wherein petitioner claimed that he is a natural born Filipino citizen, is not a sufficient act of repatriation.

Third, qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed  not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.

Santiago vs CF Sharp Crew Management (LABOR LAW)

Santiago vs CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc.

GR No. 162419, July 10, 2007

 

Facts:

 Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc. (respondent) for about five (5) years. He signed a new contract of employment with the duration of 9 months on Feb 3 1998 and he was to be deployed 10 days after. This contract was approved by POEA. A week before the date of departure, the respondent received a phone call from petitioner’s wife and some unknown callers asking not to send the latter off because if allowed, he will jump ship in Canada like his brother Christopher Santiago, who jumped ship from the C.S. Nexus in Kita-Kyushu, Japan last December, 1997.

 Because of the said information, petitioner was told that he would not be leaving for Canada anymore. This prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondent. The LA held the latter responsible. On appeal, the NLRC ruled that there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent, hence, the claims should be dismissed. The CA agreed with the NLRC’s finding that since petitioner had not departed from the Port of Manila, no employer-employee relationship between the parties arose and any claim for damages against the so-called employer could have no leg to stand on.

 

Issue:

 When does the employer-employee relationship involving seafarers commence?

 

Held/Ratio:

 A distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the employer-employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.

 Respondent’s act of preventing petitioner from departing the port of Manila and boarding "MSV Seaspread" constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to petitioner’s cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and unreasonably reneged on its obligation to deploy petitioner and must therefore answer for the actual damages he suffered.

Caltex Phils. vs CA (NIL)

Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Security Bank and Trust Co. 

G.R. No. 97753 

August 10, 1992 

FACTS:

Security bank issued Certificates of Time Deposits (CTD) to Angel dela Cruz.  The same were given by Dela Cruz to Caltex in connection to his purchase of fuel products of the latter.  On a later date, Dela Cruz approached the bank manager,  communicated  the  loss  of  the  certificates  and  requested  for  a reissuance.

Upon compliance with some formal requirements, he was issued replacements.  Thereafter, he secured a loan from the bank where he assigned the certificates as security.    Here  comes  the  petitioner, averred  that  the  certificates  were  not  actually  lost  but  were  given  as security for payment for fuel purchases.

The bank demanded some proof of the agreement but the petitioner failed to comply.    The loan matured and the time deposits were terminated and then applied to the payment of the loan. Petitioner demands the payment of the certificates but to no avail.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the certificates of time deposits (CTDs) are negotiable instruments?

HELD:

Yes. The Court held that the CTDs are negotiable instruments. The CTDs in question undoubtedly meet the requirements of the law for negotiability.

The Negotiable Instruments Law provides, an instrument to be negotiable must conform to certain requirements, hence,

1. It must be in writing and signed by the maker or drawer;
2. Must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money;
3. Must be payable on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time;
4. Must be payable to order or to bearer; and
5. Where the instrument is addressed to a drawee, he must be named or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty.

The documents provide that the amounts deposited shall be repayable to the depositor.  And who, according to the document, is the depositor? It is the “bearer.” The documents do not say that the depositor is Angel de la Cruz and that the amounts deposited are repayable specifically to him. Rather, the amounts are to  be repayable to the  bearer  of  the  documents  or,  for  that  matter,  whosoever  may  be  the bearer at the time of presentment.

If  it  was  really  the  intention  of  respondent  bank  to  pay  the  amount  to Angel de la Cruz only, it could have with facility so expressed that fact in clear and categorical terms in the documents, instead of having the word “BEARER” stamped on the space provided for the name of the depositor in each  CTD.  On  the  wordings  of  the  documents,  therefore,  the  amounts deposited  are  repayable  to  whoever  may  be  the  bearer  thereof.

Thus, petitioner’s aforesaid witness merely declared that Angel de la Cruz is the depositor  “insofar  as  the  bank  is  concerned,”  but  obviously  other  parties not  privy  to  the  transaction  between  them  would  not  be  in  a  position  to know that the depositor is not the bearer stated in the  CTDs. Hence, the situation  would require any party dealing with the CTDs to go behind the plain  import  of  what  is  written  thereon  to  unravel  the  agreement  of  the parties  thereto  through  facts  aliunde.  This  need  for  resort  to  extrinsic evidence  is  what  is  sought  to  be  avoided  by  the  Negotiable  Instruments Law  and  calls  for  the  application  of  the  elementary  rule  that  the interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.