Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. vs CA (NIL)

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. vs Court of Appeals 

G.R. No. 88866

February 18, 1991

FACTS:

Various treasury warrants drawn by the Philippine Fish Marketing Authority were subsequently indorsed by Golden Savings. Petitioner allowed Golden Savings to withdraw thrice from uncleared treasury warrants as the former was exasperated over persistent inquiries of the latter after one week. Warrants were later dishonored by the Bureau of Treasury.

ISSUE:

(a) Whether or not treasury warrants are negotiable instruments.

(b) Whether or not petitioner’s negligence would bar them for recovery.

RULING:

(a) NO. The indication of fund as the source of the payment to be made on the treasury warrants makes the order or promise to pay “not unconditional” and the warrants themselves non-negotiable. Metrobank cannot contend that by indorsing the warrants in general, Golden Savings assumed that they were “genuine and in all respects what they purport to be,” in accordance with Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The simple reason is that this law is not applicable to the non-negotiable treasury warrants.

(b) YES. Metrobank was negligent in giving Golden Savings the impression that the treasury warrants had been cleared and that, consequently, it was safe to allow Gomez to withdraw the proceeds thereof from his account with it. Without such assurance, Golden Savings would not have allowed the withdrawals; with such assurance, there was no reason not to allow the withdrawal. However, withdrawals released after the notice of the dishonor may be debited as it will result to unjust enrichment.

Kauffman vs PNB (NIL)

 

KAUFFMAN vs THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK 

G.R. No. 16454 

September 29, 1921

Fact:

Plaintiff, President of Philippine Fiber and Produce Company was entitled to dividend from the said company. The treasurer of the company Cabled transfer the said dividends through Respondent bank to New York, then upon the confirmation the New York branch of the receipt of the funds, communicated the said receipt to the plaintiff informing the availability of the fund. Subsequently, the respondent bank decided to withhold the said funds denying the plaintiff of its access. The plaintiff questioned the action of the respondent in the court. The respondent argued that the plaintiff has no cause of action because he is not a party in the contract of transferring funds and the transaction will not fall under the provisions of the Negotiable Instrument Law.

Issue:

Whether the plaintiff has cause of action with respect to the Negotiable Instrument Law?

Held:

No, the plaintiff has no cause of action with respect only to the Negotiable Instrument Law. The transaction of the Respondent and the Philippine Fiber and Produce Company is not a negotiable Instrument. The provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law can come into operation when there is a document in existence of the character described in section 1 of the Law; and no rights properly speaking arise in respect to said instrument until it is delivered. In this case there was an order, it is true, transmitted by the defendant bank to its New York branch, for the payment of a specified sum of money to George A. Kauffman. But this order was not made payable “to order or “to bearer,” as required in subsection (d) of that Act; and inasmuch as it never left the possession of the bank, or its representative in New York City, there was no delivery in the sense intended in section 16 of the same Law. In this connection it is unnecessary to point out that the official receipt delivered by the bank to the purchaser of the telegraphic order, and already set out above, cannot itself be viewed in the light of a negotiable instrument, although it affords complete proof of the obligation actually assumed by the bank.

Santiago vs Republic (CONSTI LAW-state's immunity)

 

Ildefonso Santiago, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Alfredo T. Santiago, petitioner, 

vs. 

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Director, Bureau of Plant Industry, and the Regional Director, Region IX, Zamboanga City, repondent.

December 19, 1978

Facts: 

On August 9, 1976, Ildefonso Santiago through his counsel filed an action for revocation of a Deed of Donation executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971, with the Bureau of Plant Industry as the Donee, in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. Mr. Santiago alleged that the Bureau, contrary to the terms of donation, failed to install lighting facilities and water system on the property and to build an office building and parking lot thereon which should have been constructed and ready for occupancy on before December7, 1974. That because of the circumstances, Mr. Santiago concluded that he was exempt from compliance with an explicit constitutional command, as invoked in the Santos v Santos case, a 1952 decision which is similar. The Court of First Instance dismissed the action in favor of the respondent on the ground that the state cannot be sued without its consent, and Santos v Santos case is discernible. The Solicitor General, Estelito P. Mendoza affirmed the dismissal on ground of constitutional mandate. Ildefonso Santiago filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Issue: 

Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.

Held: 

The Supreme Court rules, that the constitutional provision shows a waiver. Where there is consent, a suit may be filed. Consent need not to be express. It can be implied. In this case it must be emphasized, goes no further than a rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being a Donee, is entitle to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation.

 The writ of Certiorari prayed is granted and the order of dismissal of October 20, 1977 is nullified, set aside and declare to be without force and effect. The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch II, is hereby directed to proceed with this case, observing the procedure set forth in the rules of court. No cost.