Sunday, May 9, 2021

Halaguena vs PAL (Labor Law)

Halaguena, et. al. vs Philippines Airlines, Inc. 

GR No. 172013

October 2, 2009

FACTS: 

Petitioners were employees as flight attendants of respondent PAL. They were members of Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP). The petitioners manifested that the CBA provision on the compulsory retirement (female 55 y.o; male 60 y.o) was discriminatory. They filed a special civil action for declaratory relief with a prayer for the issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC. The RTC issued an order enjoining the respondent for implementing Sec 144 of the CBA . Respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA praying that the order of RTC be annulled and set aside for having issued without and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The CA granted, declaring RTC to have no jurisdiction over the case. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: 

Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over petitioners' action challenging the legality or constitutionality of the provisions on compulsory retirement age contained in the CBA between PAL and FASAP. 

RULING: 

Yes, RTC has jurisdiction. From the petitioners' allegations and relief prayed for, it is clear that the issue raised is whether the Sec 144 part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA is unlawful and unconstitutional. Here, the petitoners‘ primary relief is the annulment of the Sec 144 Part A which allegedly discriminates against them for being female flight attendants. The subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, exclusively cognizable by the RTC, pursuant to Sec 19 of BP 129, as amended. Being an ordinary action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals. The said issue cannot be solved solely applying the LC. Rather, it requires the application of Constitution, labor statues, law on contracts and the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, and the power to apply and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial court, a court of general jurisdiction.

Domondon vs NLRC (Labor Law)

Domondon vs NLRC

471 SCRA 559

Facts: 

Petitioner Domondon was hired as Material Manager by the Van Melle Phils. All things went well until a precious general manager was replaced by Have, a Dutch National. Have requested Domondon to file his resignation letter. He refused and his life at work became difficult until he was removed from the company. He later filed for a complaint. In their counter complaint, the respondent denied Domondon‘s allegations and even allowed him to resign. Respondent further averred the parties agreed that in order for him to own the car, he had an agreement with company that petitioner must pay for it in order to transfer ownership thereof. Subsequent demands were made but to no avail. When raised to the Labor Arbiter, the complaint by Domondon was denied. 

Issue: 

Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear the counterclaim of the employer and the return of the car for failure of Domondon to pay. 

Ruling: 

Yes. The Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction. The Court holds by the designating clause ― arising from employer- employee relationship. Article 217 should apply with equal force to the claim of an employer for actual damages against its employee where the basis of the claim arises from or necessarily connected with the fact of termination, and should be entered as a counterclaim in the illegal dismissal case. Private respondent herein made a counterclaim involving the transfer of ownership of the company car to petitioner. Such transfer is connected with Domondon‘s resignation and thus is covered in the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

Banez vs Valdevilla (Labor Law)

Banez vs Valdevilla, 

GR No. 128024, May 9, 2000, 

331 SCRA 584

Facts: 

Petitioner was the sales operations manager of private respondent in its branch in Iligan City. In 1993, private respondent "indefinitely suspended" petitioner and the latter filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC-Iligan City. LA Palangan found petitioner to have been illegally dismissed. NLRC likewise dismissed the same for having filed out of time. Elevated by petition for certiorari before SC, the case was dismissed on technical grounds. Private respondent filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Misamis Oriental to which petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the above complaint. He interposed in the court below that the action for damages, having arisen from an employer-employee relationship, was squarely under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the NLRC under Article 217(a), paragraph 4 of the Labor Code and is barred by reason of the final judgment in the labor case. He accused private respondent of splitting causes of action 

Issue:

Whether Art. 217 apply to employer with regard to its claim of damages against its employees 

Ruling:

Article 217 should apply with equal force to the claim of an employer for actual damages against its dismissed employee, where the basis for the claim arises from or is necessarily connected with the fact of termination, and should be entered as a counterclaim in the illegal dismissal case In the case at bar, private respondent's claim against petitioner for actual damages arose from a prior employer-employee relationship. In the first place, private respondent would not have taken issue with petitioner's "doing business of his own" had the latter not been concurrently its employee. Thus, the damages alleged in the complaint below are: first, those amounting to lost profits and earnings due to petitioner's abandonment or neglect of his duties as sales manager, having been otherwise preoccupied by his unauthorized installment sale scheme; and second, those equivalent to the value of private respondent's property and supplies which petitioner used in conducting his "business ". Second, and more importantly, to allow respondent court to proceed with the instant action for damages would be to open anew the factual issue of whether petitioner's installment sale scheme resulted in business losses and the dissipation of private respondent's property. This issue has been duly raised and ruled upon in the illegal dismissal case. Respondent court clearly having no jurisdiction over private respondent's complaint for damages. Thus, private respondent's remedy is not in the filing of this separate action for damages, but in properly perfecting an appeal from the Labor Arbiter's decision.

Pacific Consultants vs Schonfield (Labor Law)

Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc. vs Schonfield

GR No. 166920 

February 19, 2007

Facts:

Respondent is a Canadian Citizen and was a resident of British Columbia, Canada. He had been a consultant in the field of environmental engineering. The petitioner was engaged in the business of providing specialty and technical services. Eventually, Schonfield was hired as a Sector Manager for water and sanitation with a condition that any questions regarding the conditions of employment between the employee and the company is to be settled by the Court of Arbitration in London. Unfortunately, respondent was terminated for the reason that the company was not successful in the water and sanitation business. The respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioner before the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner contended that the venue was improperly laid under the conditions on employment where the parties had agreed that any employment related dispute be brought before the London Court of Arbitration. 

Issue:

WON the contention of the petitioner is valid? 

Held: 

No. The rule on stipulations regarding the venue are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulation in a contract do not supersede the general rule set forth in rule 4 of the rules of court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.

Sim vs NLRC (Labor Law)

Sim vs NLRC

GR No. 157376, 

October 2, 2007

 Facts:

Corazon Sim (petitioner) filed a case for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter, alleging that she was initially employed by Equitable PCI-Bank (respondent) in 1990 as Italian Remittance Marketing Consultant to the Frankfurt Representative Office. Eventually, she was promoted to Manager position, until September 1999, when she received a letter from Remegio David, the Senior Officer, European Head of PCI Bank, and Managing Director of PCIB- Europe, informing her that she was being dismissed due to loss of trust and confidence based on alleged mismanagement and misappropriation of funds. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction and/or lack of merit stressing that the labor relations system in the Philippines has no extra-territorial jurisdiction. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision and dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of merit.

 Issue:

WON the Labor Arbiter has extra-territorial jurisdiction.

 Ruling:

Article 217 of the Labor Code provides for the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission x x x Moreover, Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,18 provides:

SECTION 10. Money Claims.  Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within 90 calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. Also, Section 62 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 804219 provides that the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all claims arising out of employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, subject to the rules and procedures of the NLRC. 

Under these provisions, it is clear that labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations, including termination disputes involving all workers, among whom are overseas Filipino workers.

PNB vs Cabansag (Labor Law)

PNB vs Cabansag 

GR No. 157010 

June 21, 2005

Facts:

Florence Cabansag arrived in Singapore as a tourist. She applied for employment with the Singapore Branch of the PNB, organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. The Branch Office had two types of employees: a) expatriates or the regular employees, hired in Manila and assigned abroad and b) locally (direct) hired. VicePresident of the PNB offered her a temporary appointment as Credit Officer with several conditions which Florence accepted. The Philippine Embassy in Singapore processed the employment contract of Florence and was issued by the POEA an Overseas Employment Certificate certifying she was a bona fide contract worker for Singapore. After 3 months, Florence was asked to resign as a cost-cutting measure of the Bank. She was warned that unless she submitted her letter of resignation, her employment record will be blemished with the notation "DISMISSED". The LA rendered judgment in favor of the complainant finding the Bank guilty of illegal dismissal and devoid of due process. NLRC and CA affirmed this decision and stated that even though respondent secured an employment pass from the Singapore Ministry of Employment, she did not waive Philippine labor laws, or the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter or the NLRC over her complaint for illegal dismissal. 

Issue:

Do the LA and NLRC has jurisdiction over a tourist employee hired in a foreign country but worked for PNB Singapore branch? 

Ruling: 

Yes. Based on the provisions of Art. 217 of the LC, and Sec.10 of RA 8042, labor arbiters clearly have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from EE, including termination disputes involving all workers, among whom are overseas Filipino workers. Securing the employment pass from the Singaporean Ministry of Manpower does not automatically mean that the non-citizen is thereby bound by local laws only. It does not at all imply a waiver of one's national laws on labor. Noteworthy is the fact that respondent likewise applied for and secured an Overseas Employment Certificate from the POEA through the Phil. Embassy in Singapore. Under our law, this document authorized her working status in a foreign country and entitled her to all benefits and processes under our statutes.

Rural Bank of Coron vs Cortes (Labor Law)

Rural Bank of Coron (Palawan) Inc. vs Cortes 

GR No. 164888

December 6, 2006

FACTS:

Annalisa Cortes was hired as the Corporate Secretary and Personnel Officer of the Rural Bank of Coron, and a Personnel Officer of both Empire Cold Storage and Development Corporation, and Citizens Development Inc. Upon inspection of the books of the said corporations where Annalisa was hired as a personnel officer, it was discovered that the latter was involved in several anomalies, prompting them to terminate her services from the corporations. Annalisa stated her willingness to abide the decision regarding her termination but stressed her right to separation pay. When her demand went unheeded, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries and other benefits. The petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it was an intracorporate controversy involving the removal of a corporate officer. The LA found that Annalisa was not a corporate officer, and thus the case falls within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the LA. 

ISSUE: 

Does the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over Cortes' complaint?

RULING: 

Yes. While Cortes was the Corporate Secretary of the Rural Bank of Coron, she was also its Financial Assistant and the Personnel Officer of the two other petitioner corporations. Jurisprudence instructs that a corporation can engage its corporate officers to perform services under a circumstance which would make them employees. The Labor Arbiter has thus jurisdiction over Cortes' complaint.


Austria vs NLRC (Labor Law)

Austria vs NLRC and Cebu City Central Philippines Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventist

GR No. 124382

August 16, 1999

Facts: 

The Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh day Adventist (SDA) is a religious corporation to which Pastor Austria has worked as an evangelist. He advanced position under a promotion until his services were terminated due to an alleged unremitted offerings collected by his wife and several other altercations with other fellow Pastors. Austria filed for Illegal Dismissal against the SDA and was given a favorable decision. When elevated to the NLRC, SDA received a favorable decision. Thus, Austria now questioned the jurisdiction in this case. 

Issue: 

Does the NLRC has jurisdiction over this case?

Ruling: 

Yes. This case does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to  bar the State from taking cognizance from the same. What is involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation with the practice of faith. In this case, petitioner was not excommunicated but was terminated from employment. Coupled with this act, it is evident that the SDA furnished the NLRC with the copy of the petitioner‘s letter of termination. It is an eloquent admission of the jurisdiction of the NLRC.


Atlas Farms vs NLRC (Labor Law)

Atlas Farms Inc. vs NLRC

GR No. 142244 

November 18, 2002

 

Facts:

Jaime O. dela Peña was employed as a veterinary aide by petitioner and terminated. He was re-hired by petitioner and given the additional job of feed mill operator. He was instructed to train selected workers to operate the feed mill. He was allegedly caught urinating and defecating on company premises not intended for the purpose. The farm manager of petitioner issued a formal notice directing him to explain why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for violating company rules and regulations. Peña never bothered to explain thus he was terminated with separation pay. Marcial I. Abion was a carpenter/mason and a maintenance man whose employed by petitioner and allegedly caused the clogging of the fishpond drainage resulting in damages worth several hundred thousand pesos when he improperly disposed of the cut grass and other waste materials into the pond‘s drainage system. Upon failure to explain what happened after notice, he was terminated with separation pay. Peña and Abion filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal that were later consolidated. Both claimed that their termination from service was due to petitioner‘s suspicion that they were the leaders in a plan to form a union to compete and replace the existing management-dominated union. Labor arbiter dismissed their complaints on the ground that the grievance machinery in the collective bargaining agreement had not yet been exhausted. Private respondents availed of the grievance process, but later on refiled the case due to lack of sympathy on petitioner‘s part to engage in conciliation proceedings. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as it belonged to the grievance machinery and thereafter the voluntary arbitrator, as provided in the CBA. Labor arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Thus, private respondents brought the case to the NLRC, which reversed the labor arbiter‘s decision. Dissatisfied with the NLRC ruling, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the same. Hence this petition.

 

Issue:

WON the labor arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction to decide complaints for illegal dismissal?

 

Ruling:

Article 217 of the Labor Code provides that labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over termination disputes. A possible exception is provided in Article 261 of the Labor Code, which provides that- The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the grievance Machinery or Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Where the dispute is just in the interpretation, implementation or enforcement stage, it may be referred to the grievance machinery set up in the CBA, or brought to voluntary arbitration. But, where there was already actual termination, with alleged violation of the employee‘s rights, it is already cognizable by the labor arbiter. In sum, we conclude that the labor arbiter and then the NLRC had jurisdiction over the cases involving private respondents’ dismissal, and no error was committed by the appellate court in upholding their assumption of jurisdiction.

Bay Haven vs Abuan (Labor Law)

Bay Haven, Inc. vs Abuan

GR No. 160859 

July 30, 2008

 

Facts:

Upon complaint of Florentino Abuan, one of herein respondents, the DOLE, in the exercise of its visitorial, inspection and enforcement powers, through its Regional Director for NCR, issued an Order commanding petitioners to pay respondents a total of P638,187.15 corresponding to the latter’s claims for underpayment as petitioners’ workers. The Regional Director based his Order on the results of the inspection conducted by one of its inspectors who found that petitioner New Bay Haven Restaurant, located at the Army and Navy Club, Kalaw St., Manila, under the ownership or management of petitioner Te, committed violations of Labor Standards Law. New Bay-Haven Restaurant and its co-petitioner Te filed with the DOLE-NCR Regional Office a Motion for Reconsideration of order, alleging that the office had no jurisdiction over the case and that the order was issued in denial of petitioners’ right to due process. They argued that jurisdiction over the case was lodged with the NLRC, and not the DOLE-NCR, due to the amount of the claims involved. They added that their right to due process was also denied because the order was issued without them being furnished copies of the complaint and the inspection report and without being notified of the hearings held in the case.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order. In the motion, petitioners insisted that their documentary evidence proved that their obligations to respondents had been discharged and that the DOLE had no jurisdiction over the case.

Treating the motion for reconsideration as an appeal, the DOLE Undersecretary issued a Resolution, denying the appeal filed by petitioners, 16 upholding the Regional Director’s finding that the quitclaims could not be relied upon to deny respondents’ claims, and reiterating that the DOLE had jurisdiction to decide the case.

 

Issue:

Whether the DOLE Secretary and her authorized representatives have jurisdiction to impose the monetary liability against petitioners.

 

Ruling:

The DOLE Secretary and her authorized representatives such as the DOLE-NCR Regional Director, have jurisdiction to enforce compliance with labor standards laws under the broad visitorial and enforcement powers conferred by Article 128 of the Labor Code, and expanded by R.A. No. 7730. The Court has held that the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary, exercised through his representatives, encompass compliance with all labor standards laws and other labor legislation, regardless of the amount of the claims filed by workers. This has been the rule since R.A. No. 7730 was enacted on June 2, 1994, amending Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, to expand the visitorial and enforcement powers of the DOLE Secretary. Under the former rule, the DOLE Secretary had jurisdiction only in cases where the amount of the claim does not exceed P5,000.00.

The records also clearly indicate that the Regional Director and the DOLE Secretary resolved the case based on violations found by the labor inspection officer, which do not include illegal dismissal. The said violations are within the jurisdiction of the DOLE Secretary and his representatives to address. The questioned Orders dated December 29, 1998, April 18, 2000 and September 19, 2001 did not mention illegal dismissal, and properly so, because there was no such finding in the inspector’s report. Being in the nature of compliance orders, said orders, under Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, are strictly based on “the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers x x x made in the course of inspection,” and not on any complaint filed. Though a complaint may initiate the case or an inspection, its allegations may not necessarily be upheld by the labor inspector or the Regional Director.

Batongbuhay vs Dela Serna (Labor Law)

Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. vs Sec. Dela Serna,

GR No. 886963, August 6, 1999 

370 Phil 872


Facts:

Employees filed a complaint against Batong Buhay for: 

unpaid salaries from March 16, 1987 to present, 

unpaid and ECOLA differentials under Wage OrderNos. 2 and 5, 

unpaid 13th months pay for 1985 and 1986, and 

upaid vacation/sick/compensatory leave benefits. 

Labor Standards and Welfare Officers & Regional Director: Batong Buhay must pay Ty et al. P4,818,746.40.  Regional Director directed Batong Buhay to put up a cash or surety bond otherwise a writ of execution will be issued. The Special Sheriff seized three units of Peterbuilt trucks and then sold the same by public auction. Various materials and motor vehicles were also seized on different dates and sold at public auction. Batong Buhay finally posted a supersede as bond and appealed the Order contending that the Regional Director had no jurisdiction over the case. Undersecretary dela Serna upheld the jurisdiction of the Regional Director and annulled all the auction sales conducted by Special Sheriff. Motion for Reconsideration denied. Motion for Intervention was filed by MFT Corporation and Salter Holdings Pty., Ltd. for exclusion from annulment of the properties sold at the auction sale. Granted. Motion for reconsideration denied.


Issues:

1. Whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the employees of BBGMI

2. Whether or not the auction sales conducted by the said Special Sheriff are valid


Held:

1.Yes. The subject labor standards case of the petition arose from the visitorial and enforcement powers by the Regional Director of DOLE. Even in the absence of E.O. 111, Regional Directors already had enforcement powers over money claims, effective under P.D. 850, issued on December 16,1975, which transferred labor standards cases from the arbitration system to the enforcement system. E.O. No. 111 was issued on December 24, 1986 or three months after the promulgation of the Secretary of Labor's decision upholding private respondents' salary differentials and ECOLAs on September 24, 1986. The amendment of the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Regional Director (Article 128(b)) by said E.O. 111 reflects the intention enunciated in Policy Instructions Nos. 6 and 37 to empower the Regional Directors to resolve uncontested money claims in cases where an employer-employee relationship still exists. The present law, RA 7730, can be considered a curative statute to reinforce the conclusion that the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the present labor standards case.


2. No. As a general rule, findings of fact and conclusion of law arrived at by quasi-judicial agencies are not to be disturbed absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion tainting the same. There was grave abuse of discretion when the Undersecretary, without any evidentiary support, adjudged such prices as "scandalously low". He merely relied on the self-serving assertion by the petitioner that the value of the auctioned properties was more than the price bid. The sales are null and void since on the properties of petitioner involved was constituted a mortgage between petitioner and the Development Bank of the Philippines.


Saura Import and Export vs DBP (Credit Transactions)

Saura Import and Export vs DBP, (1972)

 Facts:

Saura applied to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), before its conversion into DBP, for an industrial loan to be used for construction of factory building, for payment of the balance of the purchase price of the jute machinery and equipment and as additional working capital. In Resolution No.145, the loan application was approved to be secured first by mortgage on the factory buildings, the land site, and machinery and equipment to be installed.

 The mortgage was registered and documents for the promissory note were executed. The cancellation of the mortgage was requested to make way for the registration of a mortgage contract over the same property in favor of Prudential Bank and Trust Co., the latter having issued Saura letter of credit for the release of the jute machinery. As security, Saura execute a trust receipt in favor of the Prudential. For failure of Saura to pay said obligation, Prudential sued Saura.

 After 9 years after the mortgage was cancelled, Saura sued RFc alleging failure to comply with tits obligations to release the loan proceeds, thereby prevented it from paying the obligation to Prudential Bank.

 The trial court ruled in favor of Saura, ruling that there was a perfected contract between the parties ad that the RFC was guilty of breach thereof.

 

Issue:

WON there was a perfected contract between the parties

 

Held:

Yes, there is. Article 1934 provides: An accepted promise to deliver something by way of commodatum or simple loan is binding upon the parties, but the commodatum or simple loan itself shall not be perfected until delivery of the object of the contract.

There was undoubtedly offer and acceptance in the case. When an application for a loan of money was approved by resolution of the respondent corporation and the responding mortgage was executed and registered, there arises a perfected consensual contract.



VICAR vs CA (Credit Transactions)

Catholic Vicar Apostolic vs. CA

165 SCRA 515 (1988)

 Facts:

Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province (VICAR for brevity) filed an application for registration of title over Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, said Lots being the sites of the Catholic Church building, convents, high school building, school gymnasium, school dormitories, social hall, stonewalls, etc. The Heirs of Juan Valdez and the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano filed their Answer/Opposition on Lots Nos. 2 and 3, respectively, asserting ownership and title thereto since their predecessors’ house was borrowed by petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent were destroyed.. After trial on the merits, the land registration court promulgated its Decision confirming the registrable title of VICAR to Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4.

The Heirs of Juan Valdez appealed the decision of the land registration court to the then Court of Appeals, The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. Thereupon, the VICAR filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing his application for registration of Lots 2 and 3.

Issue:

WON the failure to return the subject matter of commodatum constitutes an adverse possession on the part of the owner

Held:

No. The bailees’ failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the property subject matter of commodatum. Petitioner repudiated the trust by declaring the properties in its name for taxation purposes.

Saturday, May 8, 2021

Cayat vs COMELEC (Election Laws)

Cayat vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 163776

April 24, 2007


FACTS:

Father Nardo Cayat and Thomas Palileng are the only mayoralty candidates for the May 2004 elections in Buguias Benguet. Palileng filed a petition for cancellation of the COC of Cayat on the ground of misrepresentation. Palileng argues that Cayat misrepresents himself when he declared in his COC that he is eligible to run as mayor when in fact he is not because he is serving probation after being convicted for the offense of acts of lasciviousness. Comelec, granted the petition of Palileng and Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration. Such, MR was denied because Cayat failed to pay the filing fee and hence, it was declared final and executory. Despite this decision, Cayat was still proclaimed as the winner and Palileng filed a petition for annulment of proclamation. Comelec declared Palileng as the duly elected mayor and Feliseo Bayacsan as the duly elected vice mayor. Bayacsan argues that he should be declared as mayor because of the doctrine of rejection of second placer.

 

ISSUE:

WON the rejection of second placer doctrine is applicable.

 

HELD:

The doctrine cannot be applied in this case because the disqualification of Cayat became final and executory before the elections and hence, there is only one candidate to speak of. The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. As such, Palileng is the only candidate and the duly elected mayor. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’s favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: 

(1) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and 

(2) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification became final only after the elections.

Labo vs COMELEC (Election Laws)

Labo Jr. vs COMELEC and Lardizabal

G.R. No. 86564

August 1, 1989

Facts:

Petitioner Labo was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City. Private respondent Lardizabal, the losing candidate, filed a petition for quo warranto questioning petitioner’s citizenship. The latter claims that petitioner is a naturalized Australian citizen, having married an Australian citizen. Records also showed petitioner’s oath and affirmation of allegiance to the Queen of Australia. These were not denied; petitioner however claimed that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship and that his naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous.

Issue:

Is the petitioner a Filipino citizen?

Ruling:

NO. CA No. 63 enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. All of which are applicable to the petitioner. In connection with this, Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution provides that, “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”

Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.

Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725, providing that:

… (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to public office.

Ex-Bataan vs Laguesma (LABOR LAW)

 Ex-Bataan Veterans Security Agency, Inc. vs The Secretary of Labor Laguesma

GR No. 152396 

November 20, 2007

Facts:

EBVSAI is in the business of providing security services while respondents are EBVSAI employees assigned to the Napocor, Ambuklao, Benguet. Private respondents instituted a complaint for underpayment of wages against EBVSAI before the Regional Office of DOLE. The Regional Office conducted a complaint inspection at the Ambuklao Plant where they observed violations of labor standards law. On the same date, the Regional Office issued a notice of hearing. The Regional Director then issued a compliance order. EBVSAI filed a motion for reconsideration and alleged that the Regional Director does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the money claim of each respondent exceeded P5,000.00. The Regional Director denied EBVSAI’s motion. EBVSAI appealed to the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of the Regional Director with modification. EBVSAI filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the Secretary of Labor.

           

Issue:

Did Regional Director acquire jurisdiction considering that notice was served at the plant and not at its main office and that it was addressed to its Vice President?

 

Held:

The Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices state that notices and copies of orders shall be served on the parties or their duly authorized representatives at their last known address or, if they are represented by counsel, through the latter. The rules shall be liberally construed and only in the absence of any applicable provision will the Rules of Court apply in a suppletory character. In this case, EBVSAI does not deny having received the notices of hearing. EBVSAI can no longer question the jurisdiction of the Regional Director after receiving the notices of hearing and after appearing before the Regional Director.


Republic vs Bagtas (Credit Transactions-commodatum)

Republic vs Bagtas

6 SCRA 262

Facts: 

Bagtas borrowed three bulls from the Bureau of Animal Industry for one year for breeding purposes subject to payment of breeding fee of 10% of book value of the bull. Upon expiration, Bagtas asked for renewal. The renewal was granted only to one bull. Bagtas offered to buy the bulls at its book value less depreciation but the Bureau refused. The Bureau said that Bagtas should either return or buy it at book value. Bagtas proved that he already returned two of the bulls, and the other bull died during a Huk raid, hence, obligation already extinguished. He claims that the contract is a commodatum hence, loss through fortuitous event should be borne by the owner.

 

Issue: 

WON Bagtas is liable for the death of the bull.

Held: 

Yes. Commodatum is essentially gratuitous. However, in this case, there is a 10% charge. If this is considered compensation, then the case at bar is a lease. Lessee is liable as possessor in bad faith because the period already lapsed.

Even if this is a commodatum, Bagtas is still liable because the fortuitous event happened when he held the bull and the period stipulated already expired and he is liable because the thing loaned was delivered with appraisal of value and there was no contrary stipulation regarding his liability in case there is a fortuitous event.

PAL vs CA (NIL)

PAL vs CA

GR No. 49188, January 30, 1990


Facts:

 The petition involved the alias writ of execution when respondent Amelia Tan commenced a complaint for damages against PAL, which CDI Manila rendered a decision in her favor.

The CA affirmed the decision with modification that PAL shall pay Tan P25,000.00 as damages and P5,000.00 as attorney's fee, with costs. The case was remanded to the trial court for execution and Tan filed a motion praying for the issuance of a writ of execution of the judgment rendered by the CA. Four months later, Tan moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution stating that the judgment rendered by the lower court, and affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, remained unsatisfied. In opposition, PAL countered that it already fully paid its obligation to Tan through the deputy sheriff of the respondent court, Emilio Z. Reyes, as evidenced by cash vouchers properly signed and receipted by said sheriff who had absconded.

 

Issues:

(1.)   Whether or not the payment made to the absconding sheriff by check in his name did operate to satisfy the judgment debt.

(2.) Whether or not such payments extinguish the judgment debt.

 

Held:

 (1.) No, the Court disagrees that the payment made to the absconding sheriff by check in his name operates to satisfy the judgment debt. In general, a payment, in order to be effective to discharge an obligation, must be made to the proper person. Article 1240 of the Civil Code provides that “Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it.” In the instant case, because PAL did not issue the checks intended for her, in her name, but to the absconding sheriff, such payment did not extinguish the judgment debt.

 (2.) No, the Court rules that the acceptance by the sheriff of the petitioner's checks, in the case at bar, does not, per se, operate as a discharge of the judgment debt.

Article 1249 of the Civil Code provides: The payment of debts in money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it is not possible to deliver such currency, then in the currency which is legal tender in the Philippines. The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile documents shall produce the effect of payment only when they have been cashed, or when through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired. In the meantime, the action derived from the original obligation shall be held in abeyance. Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment. A check, whether a manager's check or ordinary cheek, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. Mere delivery of checks does not discharge the obligation under a judgment. The obligation is not extinguished and remains suspended until the payment by commercial document is actually realized. Thus, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Frivaldo vs COMELEC (Election Laws)

Frivaldo vs COMELEC

174 SCRA 245

(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification for Public Office)

Facts

Petitioner was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988. On October 27, 1988, respondents filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of petitioner’s election and proclamation on the ground that he was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor.

Petitioner insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an American citizen was not “impressed with voluntariness.” His oath in his COC that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the US, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified for public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure of this defect because the electorate could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code and the Omnibus Election Code.

Issue

Whether or not petitioner was qualified to run for public office.

Held: 

No. First, petitioner’s loss of his naturalized American citizenship did not and could not have the effect of automatic restoration of his Philippine citizenship.

Second, the mere filing of COC wherein petitioner claimed that he is a natural born Filipino citizen, is not a sufficient act of repatriation.

Third, qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed  not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.

Santiago vs CF Sharp Crew Management (LABOR LAW)

Santiago vs CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc.

GR No. 162419, July 10, 2007

 

Facts:

 Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc. (respondent) for about five (5) years. He signed a new contract of employment with the duration of 9 months on Feb 3 1998 and he was to be deployed 10 days after. This contract was approved by POEA. A week before the date of departure, the respondent received a phone call from petitioner’s wife and some unknown callers asking not to send the latter off because if allowed, he will jump ship in Canada like his brother Christopher Santiago, who jumped ship from the C.S. Nexus in Kita-Kyushu, Japan last December, 1997.

 Because of the said information, petitioner was told that he would not be leaving for Canada anymore. This prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondent. The LA held the latter responsible. On appeal, the NLRC ruled that there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent, hence, the claims should be dismissed. The CA agreed with the NLRC’s finding that since petitioner had not departed from the Port of Manila, no employer-employee relationship between the parties arose and any claim for damages against the so-called employer could have no leg to stand on.

 

Issue:

 When does the employer-employee relationship involving seafarers commence?

 

Held/Ratio:

 A distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the employer-employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.

 Respondent’s act of preventing petitioner from departing the port of Manila and boarding "MSV Seaspread" constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to petitioner’s cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and unreasonably reneged on its obligation to deploy petitioner and must therefore answer for the actual damages he suffered.

Thursday, May 6, 2021

Caltex Phils. vs CA (NIL)

Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Security Bank and Trust Co. 

G.R. No. 97753 

August 10, 1992 


FACTS:

Security bank issued Certificates of Time Deposits (CTD) to Angel dela Cruz.  The same were given by Dela Cruz to Caltex in connection to his purchase of fuel products of the latter.  On a later date, Dela Cruz approached the bank manager,  communicated  the  loss  of  the  certificates  and  requested  for  a reissuance.

Upon compliance with some formal requirements, he was issued replacements.  Thereafter, he secured a loan from the bank where he assigned the certificates as security.    Here  comes  the  petitioner, averred  that  the  certificates  were  not  actually  lost  but  were  given  as security for payment for fuel purchases.

The bank demanded some proof of the agreement but the petitioner failed to comply.    The loan matured and the time deposits were terminated and then applied to the payment of the loan. Petitioner demands the payment of the certificates but to no avail.


ISSUE:

Whether or not the certificates of time deposits (CTDs) are negotiable instruments?

HELD:

Yes. The Court held that the CTDs are negotiable instruments. The CTDs in question undoubtedly meet the requirements of the law for negotiability.

The Negotiable Instruments Law provides, an instrument to be negotiable must conform to certain requirements, hence,

  1. It must be in writing and signed by the maker or drawer;
  2. Must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money;
  3. Must be payable on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time;
  4. Must be payable to order or to bearer; and
  5. Where the instrument is addressed to a drawee, he must be named or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty.

The documents provide that the amounts deposited shall be repayable to the depositor.  And who, according to the document, is the depositor? It is the “bearer.” The documents do not say that the depositor is Angel de la Cruz and that the amounts deposited are repayable specifically to him. Rather, the amounts are to  be repayable to the  bearer  of  the  documents  or,  for  that  matter,  whosoever  may  be  the bearer at the time of presentment.

If  it  was  really  the  intention  of  respondent  bank  to  pay  the  amount  to Angel de la Cruz only, it could have with facility so expressed that fact in clear and categorical terms in the documents, instead of having the word “BEARER” stamped on the space provided for the name of the depositor in each  CTD.  On  the  wordings  of  the  documents,  therefore,  the  amounts deposited  are  repayable  to  whoever  may  be  the  bearer  thereof.

Thus, petitioner’s aforesaid witness merely declared that Angel de la Cruz is the depositor  “insofar  as  the  bank  is  concerned,”  but  obviously  other  parties not  privy  to  the  transaction  between  them  would  not  be  in  a  position  to know that the depositor is not the bearer stated in the  CTDs. Hence, the situation  would require any party dealing with the CTDs to go behind the plain  import  of  what  is  written  thereon  to  unravel  the  agreement  of  the parties  thereto  through  facts  aliunde.  This  need  for  resort  to  extrinsic evidence  is  what  is  sought  to  be  avoided  by  the  Negotiable  Instruments Law  and  calls  for  the  application  of  the  elementary  rule  that  the interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. vs CA (NIL)

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. vs Court of Appeals 

G.R. No. 88866

February 18, 1991


FACTS:

Various treasury warrants drawn by the Philippine Fish Marketing Authority were subsequently indorsed by Golden Savings. Petitioner allowed Golden Savings to withdraw thrice from uncleared treasury warrants as the former was exasperated over persistent inquiries of the latter after one week. Warrants were later dishonored by the Bureau of Treasury.


ISSUE:

(a) Whether or not treasury warrants are negotiable instruments.

(b) Whether or not petitioner’s negligence would bar them for recovery.


RULING:

(a) NO. The indication of fund as the source of the payment to be made on the treasury warrants makes the order or promise to pay “not unconditional” and the warrants themselves non-negotiable. Metrobank cannot contend that by indorsing the warrants in general, Golden Savings assumed that they were “genuine and in all respects what they purport to be,” in accordance with Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The simple reason is that this law is not applicable to the non-negotiable treasury warrants.


(b) YES. Metrobank was negligent in giving Golden Savings the impression that the treasury warrants had been cleared and that, consequently, it was safe to allow Gomez to withdraw the proceeds thereof from his account with it. Without such assurance, Golden Savings would not have allowed the withdrawals; with such assurance, there was no reason not to allow the withdrawal. However, withdrawals released after the notice of the dishonor may be debited as it will result to unjust enrichment.

Kauffman vs PNB (NIL)

 

KAUFFMAN vs THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK 

G.R. No. 16454 

September 29, 1921


Fact:

Plaintiff, President of Philippine Fiber and Produce Company was entitled to dividend from the said company. The treasurer of the company Cabled transfer the said dividends through Respondent bank to New York, then upon the confirmation the New York branch of the receipt of the funds, communicated the said receipt to the plaintiff informing the availability of the fund. Subsequently, the respondent bank decided to withhold the said funds denying the plaintiff of its access. The plaintiff questioned the action of the respondent in the court. The respondent argued that the plaintiff has no cause of action because he is not a party in the contract of transferring funds and the transaction will not fall under the provisions of the Negotiable Instrument Law.

Issue:

Whether the plaintiff has cause of action with respect to the Negotiable Instrument Law?

Held:

No, the plaintiff has no cause of action with respect only to the Negotiable Instrument Law. The transaction of the Respondent and the Philippine Fiber and Produce Company is not a negotiable Instrument. The provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law can come into operation when there is a document in existence of the character described in section 1 of the Law; and no rights properly speaking arise in respect to said instrument until it is delivered. In this case there was an order, it is true, transmitted by the defendant bank to its New York branch, for the payment of a specified sum of money to George A. Kauffman. But this order was not made payable “to order or “to bearer,” as required in subsection (d) of that Act; and inasmuch as it never left the possession of the bank, or its representative in New York City, there was no delivery in the sense intended in section 16 of the same Law. In this connection it is unnecessary to point out that the official receipt delivered by the bank to the purchaser of the telegraphic order, and already set out above, cannot itself be viewed in the light of a negotiable instrument, although it affords complete proof of the obligation actually assumed by the bank.

Santiago vs Republic (CONSTI LAW-state's immunity)

 

Ildefonso Santiago, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Alfredo T. Santiago, petitioner, 

vs. 

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Director, Bureau of Plant Industry, and the Regional Director, Region IX, Zamboanga City, repondent.

December 19, 1978


Facts

On August 9, 1976, Ildefonso Santiago through his counsel filed an action for revocation of a Deed of Donation executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971, with the Bureau of Plant Industry as the Donee, in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. Mr. Santiago alleged that the Bureau, contrary to the terms of donation, failed to install lighting facilities and water system on the property and to build an office building and parking lot thereon which should have been constructed and ready for occupancy on before December7, 1974. That because of the circumstances, Mr. Santiago concluded that he was exempt from compliance with an explicit constitutional command, as invoked in the Santos v Santos case, a 1952 decision which is similar. The Court of First Instance dismissed the action in favor of the respondent on the ground that the state cannot be sued without its consent, and Santos v Santos case is discernible. The Solicitor General, Estelito P. Mendoza affirmed the dismissal on ground of constitutional mandate. Ildefonso Santiago filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Issue: 

Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.

Held: 

The Supreme Court rules, that the constitutional provision shows a waiver. Where there is consent, a suit may be filed. Consent need not to be express. It can be implied. In this case it must be emphasized, goes no further than a rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being a Donee, is entitle to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation.

 The writ of Certiorari prayed is granted and the order of dismissal of October 20, 1977 is nullified, set aside and declare to be without force and effect. The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch II, is hereby directed to proceed with this case, observing the procedure set forth in the rules of court. No cost.

RULES 57-71 AM-19-10-20-SC (CIVIL PROCEDURE)

 2019 REVISED RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE


PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

RULE 57

PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

 

Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. – At the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases:

(a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or damages, other than moral and exemplary, on a cause of action arising from law, contract, quasi-contract, delict or quasidelict against a party who is about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors;

(b) In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;

(c) In an action to recover the possession of property unjustly or fraudulently taken, detained or converted, when the property, or any part thereof, has been concealed, removed, or disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the applicant or an authorized person;

(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof;

(e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his property, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud his creditors; or

(f) In an action against a party who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, or on whom summons may be served by publication.

Section 2. Issuance and contents of order. – An order of attachment may be issued either ex parte or upon motion with notice and hearing by the court in which the action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and must require the sheriff of the court to attach so much of the property in the Philippines of the party against whom it is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant’s demand, unless such party makes deposit or gives a bond as hereinafter provided in an amount equal to that fixed in the order, which may be the amount sufficient to satisfy the applicant’s demand or the value of the property to be attached as stated by the applicant, exclusive of costs. Several writs may be issued at the same time to the sheriffs of the courts of different judicial regions.

Section 3. Affidavit and bond required. – An order of attachment shall be granted only when it appears by the affidavit of the applicant, or of some other person who personally knows the facts,

that a sufficient cause of action exists,

that the case is one of those mentioned in section 1 hereof,

that there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action, and

that the amount due to the applicant, or the value of the property the possession of which he is entitled to recover, is as much as the sum for which the order is granted above all legal counterclaims.

The affidavit, and the bond required by the next succeeding section, must be duly filed with the court before the order issues.

Section 4. Condition of applicant’s bond. – The party applying for the order must thereafter give a bond executed to the adverse party in the amount fixed by the court in its order granting the issuance of the writ, conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto.

Section 5. Manner of attaching property. – The sheriff enforcing the writ shall without delay and with all reasonable diligence attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, only so much of the property in the Philippines of the party against whom the writ is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant’s demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the court from which the writ is issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the value of the property to be attached, exclusive of costs. No levy on attachment pursuant to the writ issued under section 2 hereof shall be enforced unless it is preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint, the application for attachment, the applicant’s affidavit and bond, and the order and writ of attachment, on the defendant within the Philippines. The requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the defendant is a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom, or the defendant is a non-resident of the Philippines, or the action is one in rem or quasi in rem.  

Section 6. Sheriff’s return. – After enforcing the writ, the sheriff must likewise without delay make a return thereon to the court from which the writ issued, with a full statement of his proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the property attached, together with any counter-bond given by the party against whom attachment is issued, and serve copies thereof on the applicant.

Section 7. Attachment of real and personal property; recording thereof. – Real and personal property shall be attached by the sheriff executing the writ in the following manner:

(a) Real property, or growing crops thereon, or any interest therein, standing upon the record of the registry of deeds of the province in the name of the party against whom attachment is issued, or not appearing at all upon such records, or belonging to the party against whom attachment is issued and held by any other person, or standing on the records of the registry of deeds in the name of any other person, by filing with the registry of deeds a copy of the order, together with a description of the property attached, and a notice that it is attached, or that such real property and any interest therein held by or standing in the name of such other person are attached, and by leaving a copy of such order, description, and notice with the occupant of the property, if any, or with such other person or his agent if found within the province. Where the property has been brought under the operation of either the Land Registration Act or the Property Registration Decree, the notice shall contain a reference to the number of the certificate of title, the volume and page in the registration book where the certificate is registered, and the registered owner or owners thereof. The registrar of deeds must index attachments filed under this section in the names of the applicant, the adverse party, or the person by whom the property is held or in whose name it stands in the records. If the attachment is not claimed on the entire area of the land covered by the certificate of title, a description sufficiently accurate for the identification of the land or interest to be affected shall be included in the registration of such attachment;

(b) Personal property capable of manual delivery, by taking and safely keeping it in his custody, after issuing the corresponding receipt therefor;

(c) Stocks or shares, or an interest in stocks or shares, of any corporation or company, by leaving with the president or managing agent thereof, a copy of the writ, and a notice stating that the stock or interest of the party against whom the attachment is issued is attached in pursuance of such writ;

(d) Debts and credits, including bank deposits, financial interest, royalties, commissions and other personal property not capable of manual delivery, by leaving with the person owing such debts, or having in his possession or under his control, such credits or other personal property, or with his agent, a copy of the writ, and notice that the debts owing by him to the party against whom attachment is issued, and the credits and other personal property in his possession, or under his control, belonging to said party, are attached in pursuance of such writ;

(e) The interest of the party against whom attachment is issued in property belonging to the estate of the decedent, whether as heir, legatee, or devisee, by serving the executor or administrator or other personal representative of the decedent with a copy of the writ and notice that said interest is attached. A copy of said writ of attachment and of said notice shall also be filed in the office of the clerk of the court in which said estate is being settled and served upon the heir, legatee or devisee concerned. If the property sought to be attached is in custodia legis, a copy of the writ of attachment shall be filed with the proper court or quasi-judicial agency, and notice of the attachment served upon the custodian of such property.  

Section 8. Effect of attachment of debts, credits and all other similar personal property. – All persons having in their possession or under their control any credits or other similar personal property belonging to the party against whom attachment is issued, or owing any debts to him, at the time of service upon them of the copy of the writ of attachment and notice as provided in the last preceding section, shall be liable to the applicant for the amount of such credits, debts or other similar personal property, until the attachment is discharged, or any judgment recovered by him is satisfied, unless such property is delivered or transferred, or such debts are paid, to the clerk, sheriff, or other proper officer of the court issuing the attachment. 

Section 9. Effect of attachment of interest in property belonging to the estate of a decedent. – The attachment of the interest of an heir, legatee, or devisee in the property belonging to the estate of a decedent shall not impair the powers of the executor, administrator, or other personal representative of the decedent over such property for the purpose of administration. Such personal representative, however, shall report the attachment to the court when any petition for distribution is filed, and in the order made upon such petition, distribution may be awarded to such heir, legatee, or devisee, but the property attached shall be ordered delivered to the sheriff making the levy, subject to the claim of such heir, legatee, or devisee, or any person claiming under him.

Section 10. Examination of party whose property is attached and persons indebted to him or controlling his property; delivery of property to sheriff. – Any person owing debts to the party whose property is attached or having in his possession or under his control any credit or other personal property belonging to such party, may be required to attend before the court in which the action is pending, or before a commissioner appointed by the court, and be examined on oath respecting the same. The party whose property is attached may also be required to attend for the purpose of giving information respecting his property, and may be examined on oath. The court may, after such examination, order personal property capable of manual delivery belonging to him, in the possession of the person so required to attend before the court, to be delivered to the clerk of the court or sheriff on such terms as may be just, having reference to any lien thereon or claim against the same, to await the judgment in the action.  

Section 11. When attached property may be sold after levy on attachment and before entry of judgment. – Whenever it shall be made to appear to the court in which the action is pending, upon hearing with notice to both parties, that the property attached is perishable, or that the interests of all the parties to the action will be subserved by the sale thereof, the court may order such property to be sold at public auction in such manner as it may direct, and the proceeds of such sale to be deposited in court to abide the judgment in the action.  

Section 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counter-bond. – After a writ of attachment has been enforced, the party whose property has been attached, or the person appearing on his behalf, may move for the discharge of the attachment wholly or in part on the security given. The court shall, after due notice and hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if the movant makes a cash deposit, or files a counter-bond executed to the attaching party with the clerk of the court where the application is made, in an amount equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment, exclusive of costs. But if the attachment is sought to be discharged with respect to a particular property, the counter-bond shall be equal to the value of that property as determined by the court. In either case, the cash deposit or the counter-bond shall secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover in the action. A notice of the deposit shall forthwith be served on the attaching party. Upon the discharge of an attachment in accordance with the provisions of this section, the property attached, or the proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the party making the deposit or giving the counter-bond, or to the person appearing on his behalf, the deposit or counter-bond aforesaid standing in place of the property so released. Should such counter-bond for any reason be found to be or become insufficient, and the party furnishing the same fail to file an additional counter-bond, the attaching party may apply for a new order of attachment.  

Section 13. Discharge of attachment on other grounds. – The party whose property has been ordered attached may file a motion with the court in which the action is pending, before or after levy or even after the release of the attached property, for an order to set aside or discharge the attachment on the ground that the same was improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or that the bond is insufficient. If the attachment is excessive, the discharge shall be limited to the excess. If the motion be made on affidavits on the part of the movant but not otherwise, the attaching party may oppose the motion by counteraffidavits or other evidence in addition to that on which the attachment was made. After due notice and hearing, the court shall order the setting aside or the corresponding discharge of the attachment if it appears that it was improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or that the bond is insufficient, or that the attachment is excessive, and the defect is not cured forthwith.

Section 14. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. – If the property attached is claimed by any person other than the party against whom attachment had been issued or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto, or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves such affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter has possession of the attached property, and a copy thereof upon the attaching party, the sheriff shall not be bound to keep the property under attachment, unless the attaching party or his agent, on demand of the sheriff, shall file a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied upon. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be decided by the court issuing the writ of attachment. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond. The sheriff shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of such property, to any such third-party claimant, if such bond shall be filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property, or prevent the attaching party from claiming damages against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim, in the same or a separate action. When the writ of attachment is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff is sued for damages as a result of the attachment, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General, and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of the funds to be appropriated for the purpose.  

Section 15. Satisfaction of judgment out of property attached; return of sheriff. – If judgment be recovered by the attaching party and execution issue thereon, the sheriff may cause the judgment to be satisfied out of the property attached, if it be sufficient for that purpose in the following manner:

(a) By paying to the judgment obligee the proceeds of all sales of perishable or other property sold in pursuance of the order of the court, or so much as shall be necessary to satisfy the judgment;

(b) If any balance remains due, by selling so much of the property, real or personal, as may be necessary to satisfy the balance, if enough for that purpose remain in the sheriffs hands, or in those of the clerk of the court;

(c) By collecting from all persons having in their possession credits belonging to the judgment obligor, or owing debts to the latter at the time of the attachment of such credits or debts, the amount of such credits and debts as determined by the court in the action, and stated in the judgment, and paying the proceeds of such collection over to the judgment obligee. The sheriff shall forthwith make a return in writing to the court of his proceedings under this section and furnish the parties with copies thereof.

Section 16. Balance due collected upon an execution; excess delivered to judgment obligor. – If after realizing upon all the property attached, including the proceeds of any debts or credits collected, and applying the proceeds to the satisfaction of the judgment, less the expenses of proceedings upon the judgment, any balance shall remain due, the sheriff must proceed to collect such balance as upon ordinary execution. Whenever the judgment shall have been paid, the sheriff, upon reasonable demand, must return to the judgment obligor the attached property remaining in his hands, and any proceeds of the sale of the property attached not applied to the judgment.  

Section 17. Recovery upon the counter-bond. – When the judgment has become executory, the surety or sureties on any counter-bond given pursuant to the provisions of this Rule to secure the payment of the judgment shall become charged on such counter-bond and bound to pay the judgment obligee upon demand the amount due under the judgment, which amount may be recovered from such surety or sureties after notice and summary hearing in the same action.  

Section 18. Disposition of money deposited. – Where the party against whom attachment had been issued has deposited money instead of giving counter-bond, it shall be applied under the direction of the court to the satisfaction of any judgment rendered in favor of the attaching party, and after satisfying the judgment the balance shall be refunded to the depositor or his assignee. If the judgment is in favor of the party against whom attachment was issued, the whole sum deposited must be refunded to him or his assignee.  

Section 19. Disposition of attached property where judgment is for party against whom attachment was issued. – If judgment be rendered against the attaching party, all the proceeds of sales and money collected or received by the sheriff, under the order of attachment, and all property attached remaining in any such officer’s hands, shall be delivered to the party against whom attachment was issued, and the order of attachment discharged.  

Section 20. Claim for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive attachment. – An application for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive attachment must be filed before the trial or before appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomes executory, with due notice to the attaching party and his surety or sureties, setting forth the facts showing his right to damages and the amount thereof. Such damages may be awarded only after proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment on the main case. If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party against whom the attachment was issued, he must claim damages sustained during the pendency of the appeal by filing an application in the appellate court, with notice to the party in whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or sureties, before the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory. The appellate court may allow the application to be heard and decided by the trial court. Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party against whom the attachment was issued from recovering in the same action the damages awarded to him from any property of the attaching party not exempt from execution should the bond or deposit given by the latter be insufficient or fail to fully satisfy the award.

 

RULE 58

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

 

Section 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. – A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.

Section 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be granted by the court where the action or proceeding is pending. If the action or proceeding is pending in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, it may be issued by said court or any member thereof.

Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

Section 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. – A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when:

(a) The application in the action or proceeding is verified, and shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded; and

(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.  

(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple-sala court, shall be raffled only after notice to and in the presence of the adverse party or the person to be enjoined. In any event, such notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant’s affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party in the Philippines. However, where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the adverse party is a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom or is a nonresident thereof, the requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply.

(d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall thereafter be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing which shall be conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the sheriff’s return of service and/or the records are received by the branch selected by raffle and to which the records shall be transmitted immediately.

Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. – No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the ex parte or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided.

Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order. However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventytwo hours provided herein. In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within the said period, the temporary restraining order is deemed automatically vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not extendible without need of any judicial declaration to that effect and no court shall have authority to extend or renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued. However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary restraining order shall be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined. A restraining order issued by the Supreme Court or a member thereof shall be effective until further orders.  

The trial court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Tax Appeals that issued a writ of preliminary injunction against a lower court, board, officer, or quasi-judicial agency shall decide the main case or petition within six (6) months from the issuance of the writ. (As amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, December 12, 2007.)

Section 6. Grounds for objection to, or for motion of dissolution of, injunction or restraining order. – The application for injunction or restraining order may be denied, upon a showing of its insufficiency. The injunction or restraining order may also be denied, or, if granted, may be dissolved, on other grounds upon affidavits of the party or person enjoined, which may be opposed by the applicant also by affidavits. It may further be denied, or, if granted, may be dissolved, if it appears after hearing that although the applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be, would cause irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined while the applicant can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount fixed by the court conditioned that he will pay all damages which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of the injunction or restraining order. If it appears that the extent of the preliminary injunction or restraining order granted is too great, it may be modified.  

Section 7. Service of copies of bonds; effect of disapproval of same. – The party filing a bond in accordance with the provisions of this Rule shall forthwith serve a copy of such bond on the other party, who may except to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon. If the applicant’s bond is found to be insufficient in amount, or if the surety or sureties thereon fail to justify, and a bond sufficient in amount with sufficient sureties approved after justification is not filed forthwith, the injunction shall be dissolved. If the bond of the adverse party is found to be insufficient in amount, or the surety or sureties thereon fail to justify a bond sufficient in amount with sufficient sureties approved after justification is not filed forthwith, the injunction shall be granted or restored, as the case may be.

Section 8. Judgment to include damages against party and sureties. – At the trial, the amount of damages to be awarded to either party, upon the bond of the adverse party, shall be claimed, ascertained, and awarded under the same procedure prescribed in section 20 of Rule 57.  

Section 9. When final injunction granted. – If after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction.

 

 

RULE 59

RECEIVERSHIP

 

Section 1. Appointment of receiver. – Upon a verified application, one or more receivers of the property subject of the action or proceeding may be appointed by the court where the action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court, or a member thereof, in the following cases:

(a) When it appears from the verified application, and such other proof as the court may require, that the party applying for the appointment of a receiver has an interest in the property or fund which is the subject of the action or proceeding, and that such property or fund is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured unless a receiver be appointed to administer and preserve it;

(b) When it appears in an action by the mortgagee for the foreclosure of a mortgage that the property is in danger of being wasted or dissipated or materially injured, and that its value is probably insufficient to discharge the mortgage debt, or that the parties have so stipulated in the contract of mortgage;

(c) After judgment, to preserve the property during the pendency of an appeal, or to dispose of it according to the judgment, or to aid execution when the execution has been returned unsatisfied or the judgment obligor refuses to apply his property in satisfaction of the judgment, or otherwise to carry the judgment into effect;

(d) Whenever in other cases it appears that the appointment of a receiver is the most convenient and feasible means of preserving, administering, or disposing of the property in litigation. During the pendency of an appeal, the appellate court may allow an application for the appointment of a receiver to be filed in and decided by the court of origin and the receiver appointed to be subject to the control of said court.  

Section 2. Bond on appointment of receiver. – Before issuing the order appointing a receiver the court shall require the applicant to file a bond executed to the party against whom the application is presented, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such party all damages he may sustain by reason of the appointment of such receiver in case the applicant shall have procured such appointment without sufficient cause; and the court may, in its discretion, at any time after the appointment, require an additional bond as further security for such damages.  

Section 3. Denial of application or discharge of receiver. – The application may be denied, or the receiver discharged, when the adverse party files a bond executed to the applicant, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that such party will pay the applicant all damages he may suffer by reason of the acts, omissions, or other matters specified in the application as ground for such appointment. The receiver may also be discharged if it is shown that his appointment was obtained without sufficient cause.

Section 4. Oath and bond of receiver. – Before entering upon his duties, the receiver shall be sworn to perform them faithfully, and shall file a bond, executed to such person and in such sum as the court may direct, to the effect that he will faithfully discharge his duties in the action or proceeding and obey the orders of the court.  

Section 5. Service of copies of bonds; effect of disapproval of same. – The person filing a bond in accordance with the provisions of this Rule shall forthwith serve a copy thereof on each interested party, who may except to its sufficiency or of the surety or sureties thereon. If either the applicant’s or the receiver’s bond is found to be insufficient in amount, or if the surety or sureties thereon fail to justify, and a bond sufficient in amount with sufficient sureties approved after justification is not filed forthwith, the application shall be denied or the receiver discharged, as the case may be. If bond of the adverse party is found to be insufficient in amount or the surety or sureties thereon fail to justify, and a bond sufficient in amount with sufficient sureties approved after justification is not filed forthwith, the receiver shall be appointed or re-appointed, as the case may be.  

Section 6. General powers of receiver. – Subject to the control of the court in which the action or proceeding is pending, a receiver shall have the power to bring and defend, in such capacity, actions in his own name; to take and keep possession of the property in controversy; to receive rents; to collect debts due to himself as receiver or to the fund, property, estate, person, or corporation of which he is the receiver; to compound for and compromise the same; to make transfers; to pay outstanding debts; to divide the money and other property that shall remain among the persons legally entitled to receive the same; and generally to do such acts respecting the property as the court may authorize. However, funds in the hands of a receiver may be invested only by order of the court upon the written consent of all the parties to the action.  

No action may be filed by or against a receiver without leave of the court which appointed him.

Section 7. Liability for refusal or neglect to deliver property to receiver. – A person who refuses or neglects, upon reasonable demand, to deliver to the receiver all the property, money, books, deeds, notes, bills, documents and papers within his power or control, subject of or involved in the action or proceeding, or in case of disagreement, as determined and ordered by the court, may be punished for contempt and shall be liable to the receiver for the money or the value of the property and other things so refused or neglected to be surrendered, together with all damages that may have been sustained by the party or parties entitled thereto as a consequence of such refusal or neglect.

Section 8. Termination of receivership; compensation of receiver. – Whenever the court, motu proprio or on motion of either party, shall determine that the necessity for a receiver no longer exists, it shall, after due notice to all interested parties and hearing, settle the accounts of the receiver, direct the delivery of the funds and other property in his possession to the person adjudged to be entitled to receive them, and order the discharge of the receiver from further duty as such. The court shall allow the receiver such reasonable compensation as the circumstances of the case warrant, to be taxed as costs against the defeated party, or apportioned, as justice requires.

Section 9. Judgment to include recovery against sureties. – The amount, if any, to be awarded to any party upon any bond filed in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, shall be claimed, ascertained, and granted under the same procedure prescribed in section 20 of Rule 57.

 

RULE 60

REPLEVIN

 

Section 1. Application. – A party praying for the recovery of possession of personal property may, at the commencement of the action or at any time before answer, apply for an order for the delivery of such property to him, in the manner hereinafter provided.

Section 2. Affidavit and bond. – The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts:

(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof;

(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;

(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and

(d) The actual market value of the property. The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the applicant in the action.

Section 3. Order. – Upon the filing of such affidavit and approval of the bond, the court shall issue an order and the corresponding writ of replevin describing the personal property alleged to be wrongfully detained and requiring the sheriff forthwith to take such property into his custody.  

Section 4. Duty of the sheriff. – Upon receiving such order, the sheriff must serve a copy thereof on the adverse party, together with a copy of the application, affidavit and bond, and must forthwith take the property, if it be in the possession of the adverse party, or his agent, and retain it in his custody. If the property or any part thereof be concealed in a building or enclosure, the sheriff must demand its delivery, and if it be not delivered, he must cause the building or enclosure to be broken open and take the property into his possession. After the sheriff has taken possession of the property as herein provided, he must keep it in a secure place and shall be responsible for its delivery to the party entitled thereto upon receiving his fees and necessary expenses for taking and keeping the same.

Section 5. Return of property. – If the adverse party objects to the sufficiency of the applicant’s bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon, he cannot immediately require the return of the property, but if he does not so object, he may, at any time before the delivery of the property to the applicant, require the return thereof, by filing with the court where the action is pending a bond executed to the applicant, in double the value of the property as stated in the applicant’s affidavit for the delivery thereof to the applicant, if such delivery be adjudged, and for the payment of such sum to him as may be recovered against the adverse party, and by serving a copy of such bond on the applicant. (5a)

Section 6. Disposition of property by sheriff. – If within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the sheriff, the adverse party does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so objects and the court affirms its approval of the applicant’s bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party requires the return of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the applicant, the sheriff must return it to the adverse party.

Section 7. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. – If the property taken is claimed by any person other than the party against whom the writ of replevin had been issued or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto, or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds therefor, and serves such affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter has possession of the property and a copy thereof upon the applicant, the sheriff shall not be bound to keep the property under replevin or deliver it to the applicant unless the applicant or his agent, on demand of said sheriff, shall file a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property under replevin as provided in section 2 hereof.

In case of disagreement as to such value, the court shall determine the same. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond. The sheriff shall not be liable for damages, for the taking or keeping of such property, to any such third-party claimant if such bond shall be filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property, or prevent the applicant from claiming damages against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim, in the same or a separate action.

When the writ of replevin is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff is sued for damages as a result of the replevin, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General, and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of the funds to be appropriated for the purpose.

Section 8. Return of papers. – The sheriff must file the order, with his proceedings indorsed thereon, with the court within ten (10) days after taking the property mentioned therein.  

Section 9. Judgment. – After trial of the issues, the court shall determine who has the right of possession to and the value of the property and shall render judgment in the alternative for the delivery thereof to the party entitled to the same, or for its value in case delivery cannot be made, and also for such damages as either party may prove, with costs.

Section 10. Judgment to include recovery against sureties. – The amount, if any, to be awarded to any party upon any bond filed in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, shall be claimed, ascertained, and granted under the same procedure as prescribed in section 20 of Rule 57.

 

RULE 61

SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE

 

Section 1. Application. – At the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or final order, a verified application for support pendente lite may be filed by any party stating the grounds for the claim and the financial conditions of both parties, and accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other authentic documents in support thereof.  

Section 2. Comment. – A copy of the application and all supporting documents shall be served upon the adverse party, who shall have five (5) days to comment thereon unless a different period is fixed by the court upon his motion. The comment shall be verified and shall be accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other authentic documents in support thereof.  

Section 3. Hearing. – After the comment is filed, or after the expiration of the period for its filing, the application shall be set for hearing not more than three (3) days thereafter. The facts in issue shall be proved in the same manner as is provided for evidence on motions.  

Section 4. Order. – The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render such orders as justice and equity may require, having due regard to the probable outcome of the case and such other circumstances as may aid in the proper resolution of the question involved. If the application is granted, the court shall fix the amount of money to be provisionally paid or such other forms of support as should be provided, taking into account the necessities of the applicant and the resources or means of the adverse party, and the terms of payment or mode for providing the support. If the application is denied, the principal case shall be tried and decided as early as possible.

Section 5. Enforcement of order. – If the adverse party fails to comply with an order granting support pendente lite, the court shall, motu proprio or upon motion, issue an order of execution against him, without prejudice to his liability for contempt. (6a)

When the person ordered to give support pendente lite refuses or fails to do so, any third person who furnished that support to the applicant may, after due notice and hearing in the same case, obtain a writ of execution to enforce his right of reimbursement against the person ordered to provide such support.

Section 6. Support in criminal cases. – In criminal actions where the civil liability includes support for the offspring as a consequence of the crime and the civil aspect thereof has not been waived, reserved or instituted prior to its filing, the accused may be ordered to provide support pendente lite to the child born to the offended party allegedly because of the crime. The application therefor may be filed successively by the offended party, her parents, grandparents or guardian and the State in the corresponding criminal case during its pendency, in accordance with the procedure established under this Rule. (n)

Section 7. Restitution. – When the judgment or final order of the court finds that the person who has been providing support pendente lite is not liable therefor, it shall order the recipient thereof to return to the former the amounts already paid with legal interest from the dates of actual payment, without prejudice to the right of the recipient to obtain reimbursement in a separate action from the person legally obliged to give the support. Should the recipient fail to reimburse said amounts, the person who provided the same may likewise seek reimbursement thereof in a separate action from the person legally obliged to give such support. (n)

 

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

RULE 62

INTERPLEADER

 

Section 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.  

Section 2. Order. – Upon the filing of the complaint, the court shall issue an order requiring the conflicting claimants to interplead with one another. If the interests of justice so require, the court may direct in such order that the subject matter be paid or delivered to the court.  

Section 3. Summons. – Summons shall be served upon the conflicting claimants, together with a copy of the complaint and order.

Section 4. Motion to dismiss. – Within the time for filing an answer, each claimant may file a motion to dismiss on the ground of impropriety of the interpleader action or on other appropriate grounds specified in Rule 16. The period to file the answer shall be tolled and if the motion is denied, the movant may file his answer within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. (n)

Section 5. Answer and other pleadings. – Each claimant shall file his answer setting forth his claim within fifteen (15) days from service of the summons upon him, serving a copy thereof upon each of the other conflicting claimants who may file their reply thereto as provided by these Rules. If any claimant fails to plead within the time herein fixed, the court may, on motion, declare him in default and thereafter render judgment barring him from any claim in respect to the subject matter. The parties in an interpleader action may file counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party complaints and responsive pleadings thereto, as provided by these Rules.

Section 6. Determination. – After the pleadings of the conflicting claimants have been filed, and pre-trial has been conducted in accordance with the Rules, the court shall proceed to determine their respective rights and adjudicate their several claims.  

Section 7. Docket and other lawful fees, costs and litigation expenses as liens. – The docket and other lawful fees paid by the party who filed a complaint under this Rule, as well as the costs and litigation expenses, shall constitute a lien or charge upon the subject matter of the action, unless the court shall order otherwise.

 

RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

 

Section 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (1a, R64; En Banc Resolution, February 17, 1998.)

Section 2. Parties. – All persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration shall be made parties; and no declaration shall, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the action.  

Section 3. Notice on Solicitor General. – In any action which involves the validity of a statute, executive order or regulation, or any other governmental regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party assailing the same and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question.  

Section 4. Local government ordinances. – In any action involving the validity of a local government ordinance, the corresponding prosecutor or attorney of the local governmental unit involved shall be similarly notified and entitled to be heard. If such ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Solicitor General shall also be notified and entitled to be heard.

Section 5. Court action discretionary. – Except in actions falling under the second paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the court, motu proprio or upon motion, may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments in any case where a decision would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action, or in any case where the declaration or construction is not necessary and proper under the circumstances.

Section 6. Conversion into ordinary action. – If before the final termination of the case, a breach or violation of an instrument or a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation should take place, the action may thereupon be converted into an ordinary action, and the parties shall be allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper.  

 

RULE 64

REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS OR RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

 

Section 1. Scope. – This Rule shall govern the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit. (n)

Section 2. Mode of review. – A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided. (n)

Section 3. Time to file petition. – The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. (n)

Section 4. Docket and other lawful fees. – Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the clerk of court the docket and other lawful fees and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs. (n)

Section 5. Form and contents of petition. – The petition shall be verified and filed in eighteen (18) legible copies. The petition shall name the aggrieved party as petitioner and shall join as respondents the Commission concerned and the person or persons interested in sustaining the judgment, final order or resolution a quo. The petition shall state the facts with certainty, present clearly the issues involved, set forth the grounds and brief arguments relied upon for review, and pray for judgment annulling or modifying the questioned judgment, final order or resolution. Findings of fact of the Commission supported by substantial evidence shall be final and non-reviewable. The petition shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, final order or resolution subject thereof, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein and other documents relevant and pertinent thereto. The requisite number of copies of the petition shall contain plain copies of all documents attached to the original copy of said petition. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein, and shall contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. The petition shall further be accompanied by proof of service of a copy thereof on the Commission concerned and on the adverse party, and of the timely payment of docket and other lawful fees. The failure of petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. (n)

Section 6. Order to comment. – If the Supreme Court finds the petition sufficient in form and substance, it shall order the respondents to file their comments on the petition within ten (10) days from notice thereof; otherwise, the Court may dismiss the petition outright. The Court may also dismiss the petition if it was filed manifestly for delay, or the questions raised are too unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings. (n)

Section 7. Comments of respondents. – The comments of the respondents shall be filed in eighteen (18) legible copies. The original shall be accompanied by certified true copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein together with other supporting papers. The requisite number of copies of the comments shall contain plain copies of all documents attached to the original and a copy thereof shall be served on the petitioner. No other pleading may be filed by any party unless required or allowed by the Court. (n)

Section 8. Effect of filing. – The filing of a petition for certiorari shall not stay the execution of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, unless the Supreme Court shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just. (n) Section 9. Submission for decision. – Unless the Court sets the case for oral argument, or requires the parties to submit memoranda, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the comments on the petition, or of such other pleadings or papers as may be required or allowed, or the expiration of the period to do so.

 

RULE 65

CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS

 

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. – When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.

Section 3. Petition for mandamus. – When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (3a)

Section 4. When and where to file the petition. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion. If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. (As amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, December 12, 2007.)

Section 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. – When the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as private respondent or respondents with such public respondent or respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or respondents. Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If the case is elevated to a higher court by either party, the public respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed by the court, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings therein.  

Section 6. Order to comment. – If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify such process, the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent or respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof. Such order shall be served on the respondents in such manner as the court may direct, together with a copy of the petition and any annexes thereto. In petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the provisions of section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed. Before giving due course thereto, the court may require the respondents to file their comment to, and not a motion to dismiss, the petition. Thereafter, the court may require the filing of a reply and such other responsive or other pleadings as it may deem necessary and proper.  

Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. – The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued, enjoining the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.

The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge. (As amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, December 12, 2007.)

Section 8. Proceedings after comment is filed. – After the comment or other pleadings required by the court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof has expired, the court may hear the case or require the parties to submit memoranda. If, after such hearing or filing of memoranda or upon the expiration of the period for filing, the court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall render judgment for such relief to which the petitioner is entitled. However, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds the same patently without merit or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or if the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. In such event, the court may award in favor of the respondent treble costs solidarily against the petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to administrative sanctions under Rules 139 and 139-B of the Rules of Court. The Court may impose motu proprio, based on res ipsa loquitur, other disciplinary sanctions or measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory and unmeritorious petitions for certiorari. (As amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, December 12, 2007.)

Section 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. – A certified copy of the judgment rendered in accordance with the last preceding section shall be served upon the court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person concerned in such manner as the court may direct, and disobedience thereto shall be punished as contempt. An execution may issue for any damages or costs awarded in accordance with section 1 of Rule 39.  

 

RULE 66

QUO WARRANTO

 

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or

(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.

Section 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. – The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof, must commence such action.  

Section 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may commence action with permission of court. – The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor may, with the permission of the court in which the action is to be commenced, bring such an action at the request and upon the relation of another person; but in such case the officer bringing it may first require an indemnity for the expenses and costs of the action in an amount approved by and to be deposited in the court by the person at whose request and upon whose relation the same is brought.  

Section 4. When hearing had on application for permission to commence action. – Upon application for permission to commence such action in accordance with the next preceding section, the court shall direct that notice be given to the respondent so that he may be heard in opposition thereto; and if permission is granted, the court shall issue an order to that effect, copies of which shall be served on all interested parties, and the petition shall then be filed within the period ordered by the court. (5a)

Section 5. When an individual may commence such an action. – A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action therefor in his own name. (6)

Section 6. Parties and contents of petition against usurpation. – When the action is against a person for usurping a public office, position or franchise, the petition shall set forth the name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto, if any, with an averment of his right to the same and that the respondent is unlawfully in possession thereof. All persons who claim to be entitled to the public office, position or franchise may be made parties, and their respective rights to such public office, position or franchise determined, in the same action. (7a)

Section 7. Venue. – An action under the preceding six sections can be brought only in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondent or any of the respondents resides, but when the Solicitor General commences the action, it may be brought in a Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court. (8a)

Section 8. Period for pleadings and proceedings may be reduced; action given precedence. – The court may reduce the period provided by these Rules for filing pleadings and for all other proceedings in the action in order to secure the most expeditious determination of the matters involved therein consistent with the rights of the parties. Such action may be given precedence over any other civil matter pending in the court. (9a)

Section 9. Judgment where usurpation found. – When the respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, position or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the petitioner or relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires. (10a)

Section 10. Rights of persons adjudged entitled to public office; delivery of books and papers; damages. – If judgment be rendered in favor of the person averred in the complaint to be entitled to the public office he may, after taking the oath of office and executing any official bond required by law, take upon himself the execution of the office, and may immediately thereafter demand of the respondent all the books and papers in the respondent’s custody or control appertaining to the office to which the judgment relates. If the respondent refuses or neglects to deliver any book or paper pursuant to such demand, he may be punished for contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of the court. The person adjudged entitled to the office may also bring action against the respondent to recover the damages sustained by such person by reason of the usurpation. (15a)

Section 11. Limitations. – Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose; nor to authorize an action for damages in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment establishing the petitioner’s right to the office in question. (16a)

Section 12. Judgment for costs. – In an action brought in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, the court may render judgment for costs against either the petitioner, the relator, or the respondent, or the person or persons claiming to be a corporation, or may apportion the costs, as justice requires.

 

RULE 67

EXPROPRIATION

 

Section 1. The complaint. – The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a verified complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of expropriation, describe the real or personal property sought to be expropriated, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate interest of each defendant. If the title to any property sought to be expropriated appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect shall be made in the complaint. (1a)

Section 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government depositary. – Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary. If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be promptly fixed by the court. After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties. (2a)

Section 3. Defenses and objections. – If a defendant has no objection or defense to the action or the taking of his property, he may file and serve a notice of appearance and a manifestation to that effect, specifically designating or identifying the property in which he claims to be interested, within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter, he shall be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same. If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the summons. The answer shall specifically designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer or any subsequent pleading. A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court, in the interest of justice, may permit amendments to the answer to be made not later than ten (10) days from the filing thereof. However, at the trial of the issue of just compensation, whether or not a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he may present evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his property, and he may share in the distribution of the award. (n)

Section 4. Order of expropriation. – If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid. After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable. (4a)

Section 5. Ascertainment of compensation. – Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their report shall be submitted to the court. Copies of the order shall be served on the parties. Objections to the appointment of any of the commissioners shall be filed with the court within ten (10) days from service, and shall be resolved within thirty (30) days after all the commissioners shall have received copies of the objections. (5a)

Section 6. Proceedings by commissioners. – Before entering upon the performance of their duties, the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in the case. Evidence may be introduced by either party before the commissioners who are authorized to administer oaths on hearings before them, and the commissioners shall, unless the parties consent to the contrary, after due notice to the parties to attend, view and examine the property sought to be expropriated and its surroundings, and may measure the same, after which either party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken. (6a)

Section 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon. – The court may order the commissioners to report when any particular portion of the real estate shall have been passed upon by them, and may render judgment upon such partial report, and direct the commissioners to proceed with their work as to subsequent portions of the property sought to be expropriated, and may from time to time so deal with such property. The commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings, and such proceedings shall not be effectual until the court shall have accepted their report and rendered judgment in accordance with their recommendations. Except as otherwise expressly ordered by the court, such report shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the date the commissioners were notified of their appointment, which time may be extended in the discretion of the court. Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of the court shall serve copies thereof on all interested parties, with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire. (7a)

Section 8. Action upon commissioners’ report. – Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period but after all the interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken. (8a)

Section 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. – If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made. (9a)

Section 10. Rights of plaintiff after judgment and payment. – Upon payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of the compensation fixed by the judgment, with legal interest thereon from the taking of the possession of the property, or after tender to him of the amount so fixed and payment of the costs, the plaintiff shall have the right to enter upon the property expropriated and to appropriate it for the public use or purpose defined in the judgment, or to retain it should he have taken immediate possession thereof under the provisions of section 2 hereof. If the defendant and his counsel absent themselves from the court, or decline to receive the amount tendered, the same shall be ordered to be deposited in court and such deposit shall have the same effect as actual payment thereof to the defendant or the person ultimately adjudged entitled thereto. (10a)

Section 11. Entry not delayed by appeal; effect of reversal. – The right of the plaintiff to enter upon the property of the defendant and appropriate the same for public use or purpose shall not be delayed by an appeal from the judgment. But if the appellate court determines that plaintiff has no right of expropriation, judgment shall be rendered ordering the Regional Trial Court to forthwith enforce the restoration to the defendant of the possession of the property, and to determine the damages which the defendant sustained and may recover by reason of the possession taken by the plaintiff. (11a)

Section 12. Costs, by whom paid. – The fees of the commissioners shall be taxed as a part of the costs of the proceedings. All costs, except those of rival claimants litigating their claims, shall be paid by the plaintiff, unless an appeal is taken by the owner of the property and the judgment is affirmed, in which event the costs of the appeal shall be paid by the owner. (12a)

Section 13. Recording judgment, and its effect. – The judgment entered in expropriation proceedings shall state definitely, by an adequate description, the particular property or interest therein expropriated, and the nature of the public use or purpose for which it is expropriated. When real estate is expropriated, a certified copy of such judgment shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated, and its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff the title to the real estate so described for such public use or purpose. (13a)

Section 14. Power of guardian in such proceedings. – The guardian or guardian ad litem of a minor or of a person judicially declared to be incompetent may, with the approval of the court first had, do and perform on behalf of his ward any act, matter, or thing respecting the expropriation for public use or purpose of property belonging to such minor or person judicially declared to be incompetent, which such minor or person judicially declared to be incompetent could do in such proceedings if he were of age or competent. (14a)

 

 

RULE 68

FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE

 

Section 1. Complaint in action for foreclosure. – In an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage or other encumbrance upon real estate, the complaint shall set forth the date and due execution of the mortgage; its assignments, if any; the names and residences of the mortgagor and the mortgagee; a description of the mortgaged property; a statement of the date of the note or other documentary evidence of the obligation secured by the mortgage, the amount claimed to be unpaid thereon; and the names and residences of all persons having or claiming an interest in the property subordinate in right to that of the holder of the mortgage, all of whom shall be made defendants in the action. (1a)

Section 2. Judgment on foreclosure for payment or sale. – If upon the trial in such action the court shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation, including interest and other charges as approved by the court, and costs, and shall render judgment for the sum so found due and order that the same be paid to the court or to the judgment obligee within a period of not less than ninety (90) days nor more than one hundred twenty (120) days from the entry of judgment, and that in default of such payment the property shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment. (2a)

Section 3. Sale of mortgaged property; effect. – When the defendant, after being directed to do so as provided in the next preceding section, fails to pay the amount of the judgment within the period specified therein, the court, upon motion, shall order the property to be sold in the manner and under the provisions of Rule 39 and other regulations governing sales of real estate under execution. Such sale shall not affect the rights of persons holding prior encumbrances upon the property or a part thereof, and when confirmed by an order of the court, also upon motion, it shall operate to divest the rights in the property of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law. Upon the finality of the order of confirmation or upon the expiration of the period of redemption when allowed by law, the purchaser at the auction sale or last redemptioner, if any, shall be entitled to the possession of the property unless a third party is actually holding the same adversely to the judgment obligor. The said purchaser or last redemptioner may secure a writ of possession, upon motion, from the court which ordered the foreclosure. (3a)

Section 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale. – The amount realized from the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs of the sale, be paid to the person foreclosing the mortgage, and when there shall be any balance or residue, after paying off the mortgage debt due, the same shall be paid to junior encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to be ascertained by the court, or if there be no such encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue after payment to them, then to the mortgagor or his duly authorized agent, or to the person entitled to it. (4a)

Section 5. How sale to proceed in case the debt is not all due. – If the debt for which the mortgage or encumbrance was held is not all due as provided in the judgment, as soon as a sufficient portion of the property has been sold to pay the total amount and the costs due, the sale shall terminate; and afterwards, as often as more becomes due for principal or interest and other valid charges, the court may, on motion, order more to be sold. But if the property cannot be sold in portions without prejudice to the parties, the whole shall be ordered to be sold in the first instance, and the entire debt and costs shall be paid, if the proceeds of the sale be sufficient therefor, there being a rebate of interest where such rebate is proper. (5a)

Section 6. Deficiency judgment. – If upon the sale of any real property as provided in the next preceding section there be a balance due to the plaintiff after applying the proceeds of the sale, the court, upon motion, shall render judgment against the defendant for any such balance for which, by the record of the case, he may be personally liable to the plaintiff, upon which execution may issue immediately if the balance is all due at the time of the rendition of the judgment; otherwise, the plaintiff shall be entitled to execution at such time as the balance remaining becomes due under the terms of the original contract, which time shall be stated in the judgment. (6a)

Section 7. Registration. – A certified copy of the final order of the court confirming the sale shall be registered in the registry of deeds. If no right of redemption exists, the certificate of title in the name of the mortgagor shall be cancelled, and a new one issued in the name of the purchaser. Where a right of redemption exists, the certificate of title in the name of the mortgagor shall not be cancelled, but the certificate of sale and the order confirming the sale shall be registered and a brief memorandum thereof made by the registrar of deeds upon the certificate of title. In the event the property is redeemed, the deed of redemption shall be registered with the registry of deeds, and a brief memorandum thereof shall be made by the registrar of deeds on said certificate of title. If the property is not redeemed, the final deed of sale executed by the sheriff in favor of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale shall be registered with the registry of deeds; whereupon the certificate of title in the name of the mortgagor shall be cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the purchaser. (n)

Section 8. Applicability of other provisions. – The provisions of sections 31, 32 and 34 of Rule 39 shall be applicable to the judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages under this Rule insofar as the former are not inconsistent with or may serve to supplement the provisions of the latter. (8a)

 

RULE 69

PARTITION

 

Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. – A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.

Section 2. Order for partition, and partition by agreement thereunder. – If after the trial the court finds that the plaintiff has the right thereto, it shall order the partition of the real estate among all the parties in interest. Thereupon the parties may, if they are able to agree, make the partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties, and such partition, together with the order of the court confirming the same, shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated. (2a)

A final order decreeing partition and accounting may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. (n)

Section 3. Commissioners to make partition when parties fail to agree. – If the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion of the property as the court shall direct. (3a)

Section 4. Oath and duties of commissioners. – Before making such partition, the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in the case. In making the partition, the commissioners shall view and examine the real estate, after due notice to the parties to attend at such view and examination, and shall hear the parties as to their preference in the portion of the property to be set apart to them and the comparative value thereof, and shall set apart the same to the parties in lots or parcels as will be most advantageous and equitable, having due regard to the improvements, situation and quality of the different parts thereof. (4a)

Section 5. Assignment or sale of real estate by commissioners. – When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be divided without prejudice to the interests of the parties, the court may order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties such amounts as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the interested parties asks that the property be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale under such conditions and within such time as the court may determine. (5a)

Section 6. Report of commissioners; proceedings not binding until confirmed. – The commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings as to the partition, or the assignment of real estate to one of the parties, or the sale of the same. Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of court shall serve copies thereof on all the interested parties with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire. No proceeding had before or conducted by the commissioners shall pass the title to the property or bind the parties until the court shall have accepted the report of the commissioners and rendered judgment thereon.

Section 7. Action of the court upon commissioners’ report. – Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period but after the interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, upon hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or accept the report in part and reject it in part; and may make such order and render such judgment as shall effectuate a fair and just partition of the real estate, or of its value, if assigned or sold as above provided, between the several owners thereof. (7)

Section 8. Accounting for rent and profits in action for partition. – In an action for partition in accordance with this Rule, a party shall recover from another his just share of rents and profits received by such other party from the real estate in question, and the judgment shall include an allowance for such rents and profits. (8a)

Section 9. Power of guardian in such proceedings. – The guardian or guardian ad litem of a minor or person judicially declared to be incompetent may, with the approval of the court first had, do and perform on behalf of his ward any act, matter, or thing respecting the partition of real estate, which the minor or person judicially declared to be incompetent could do in partition proceedings if he were of age or competent. (9a)

Section 10. Costs and expenses to be taxed and collected. – The court shall equitably tax and apportion between or among the parties the costs and expenses which accrue in the action, including the compensation of the commissioners, having regard to the interests of the parties, and execution may issue therefor as in other cases. (10a)

Section 11. The judgment and its effect; copy to be recorded in registry of deeds. – If actual partition of property is made, the judgment shall state definitely, by metes and bounds and adequate description, the particular portion of the real estate assigned to each party, and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest in each party to the action in severalty the portion of the real estate assigned to him. If the whole property is assigned to one of the parties upon his paying to the others the sum or sums ordered by the court, the judgment shall state the fact of such payment and of the assignment of the real estate to the party making the payment, and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest in the party making the payment the whole of the real estate free from any interest on the part of the other parties to the action. If the property is sold and the sale confirmed by the court, the judgment shall state the name of the purchaser or purchasers and a definite description of the parcels of real estate sold to each purchaser, and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest the real estate in the purchaser or purchasers making the payment or payments, free from the claims of any of the parties to the action. A certified copy of the judgment shall in either case be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the real estate is situated, and the expenses of such recording shall be taxed as part of the costs of the action. (11a)

Section 12. Neither paramount rights nor amicable partition affected by this Rule. – Nothing in this Rule contained shall be construed so as to prejudice, defeat, or destroy the right or title of any person claiming the real estate involved by title under any other person, or by title paramount to the title of the parties among whom the partition may have been made; nor so as to restrict or prevent persons holding real estate jointly or in common from making an amicable partition thereof by agreement and suitable instruments of conveyance without recourse to an action. (12a)

Section 13. Partition of personal property. – The provisions of this Rule shall apply to partitions of estates composed of personal property, or of both real and personal property, insofar as the same may be applicable.

 

RULE 70

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

 

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. (1a)

Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. – Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings. (2a)

Section 3. Summary procedure. – Except in cases covered by the agricultural tenancy laws or when the law otherwise expressly provides, all actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the summary procedure hereunder provided. (n)

Section 4. Pleadings allowed. – The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the complaint, compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim pleaded in the answer, and the answers thereto. All pleadings shall be verified. (3a, RSP)

Section 5. Action on complaint. – The court may, from an examination of the allegations in the complaint and such evidence as may be attached thereto, dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds for the dismissal of a civil action which are apparent therein. If no ground for dismissal is found, it shall forthwith issue summons. (n)

Section 6. Answer. – Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or cross-claims shall be served and filed within ten (10) days from service of the answer in which they are pleaded. (5, RSP)

Section 7. Effect of failure to answer. – Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein. The court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney’s fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable, without prejudice to the applicability of section 3 (c), Rule 9 if there are two or more defendants. (6, RSP)

Section 8. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. – Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The provisions of Rule 18 on pre-trial shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule. The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with the next preceding section. All cross-claims shall be dismissed. (7, RSP)

If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall likewise be entitled to judgment in accordance with the next preceding section. This procedure shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the preliminary conference. No postponement of the preliminary conference shall be granted except for highly meritorious grounds and without prejudice to such sanctions as the court in the exercise of sound discretion may impose on the movant. (n)

Section 9. Record of preliminary conference. – Within five (5) days after the termination of the preliminary conference, the court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up therein, including but not limited to:

1. Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement, and if so, the terms thereof;

2. The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties;

3. Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admissions made by the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need of further proceedings, in which event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from issuance of the order;

4. A clear specification of material facts which remain controverted; and

5. Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of the case. (8, RSP)

Section 10. Submission of affidavits and position papers. – Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order, together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them. (9, RSP)

Section 11. Period for rendition of judgment. – Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment. However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last affidavit or the expiration of the period for filing the same. The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time for the rendition of the judgment. (n)

Section 12. Referral for conciliation. – Cases requiring referral for conciliation, where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after that requirement shall have been complied with. (18a, RSP)

Section 13. Prohibited pleadings and motions. – The following petitions, motions, or pleadings shall not be allowed:

1. Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with section 12;

2. Motion for a bill of particulars;

3. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;

4. Petition for relief from judgment;

5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;

6. Memoranda;

7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court;

8. Motion to declare the defendant in default;

9. Dilatory motions for postponement;

10. Reply;

11. Third-party complaints;

12. Interventions. (19a, RSP)

Section 14. Affidavits. – The affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule shall state only facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in evidence, and shall show their competence to testify to the matters stated therein. A violation of this requirement may subject the party or the counsel who submits the same to disciplinary action, and shall be cause to expunge the inadmissible affidavit or portion thereof from the record. (20, RSP)

Section 15. Preliminary injunction. – The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff. A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful detainer may, within five (5) days from the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof.

Section 16. Resolving defense of ownership. – When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. (4a)

Section 17. Judgment. – If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorney’s fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires. (6a)

Section 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or ownership. – The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building. The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. (7a)

Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. – If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period.

The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed. All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized government depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on the merits. After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by the defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court.

In any case wherein it appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court, damages for such deprivation of possession and restoration of possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal. (8a)

Section 20. Preliminary mandatory injunction in case of appeal. – Upon motion of the plaintiff, within ten (10) days from the perfection of the appeal to the Regional Trial Court, the latter may issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore the plaintiff in possession if the court is satisfied that the defendant’s appeal is frivolous or dilatory, or that the appeal of the plaintiff is prima facie meritorious.

Section 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. – The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. (10a)

 

RULE 71

CONTEMPT

 

Section 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. – A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court. (1a)

Section 2. Remedy therefrom. – The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him. (2a)

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him. But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings. (3a)

Section 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (n)

Section 5. Where charge to be filed. – Where the charge for indirect contempt has been committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such court. Where such contempt has been committed against a lower court, the charge may be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place in which the lower court is sitting; but the proceedings may also be instituted in such lower court subject to appeal to the Regional Trial Court of such place in the same manner as provided in section 11 of this Rule. (4a; En Banc Resolution, July 21, 1998.)

Section 6. Hearing; release on bail. – If the hearing is not ordered to be had forthwith, the respondent may be released from custody upon filing a bond, in an amount fixed by the court, for his appearance at the hearing of the charge. On the day set therefor, the court shall proceed to investigate the charge and consider such comment, testimony or defense as the respondent may make or offer. (5a)

Section 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. – If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If he is adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a lower court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both. If the contempt consists in the violation of a writ of injunction, temporary restraining order or status quo order, he may also be ordered to make complete restitution to the party injured by such violation of the property involved or such amount as may be alleged and proved. The writ of execution, as in ordinary civil actions, shall issue for the enforcement of a judgment imposing a fine unless the court otherwise provides. (6a)

Section 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed. – When the contempt consists in the refusal or omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the respondent to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he performs it. (7a)

Section 9. Proceeding when party released on bail fails to answer. – When a respondent released on bail fails to appear on the day fixed for the hearing, the court may issue another order of arrest or may order the bond for his appearance to be forfeited and confiscated, or both; and, if the bond be proceeded against, the measure of damages shall be the extent of the loss or injury sustained by the aggrieved party by reason of the misconduct for which the contempt charge was prosecuted, with the costs of the proceedings, and such recovery shall be for the benefit of the party injured. If there is no aggrieved party, the bond shall be liable and disposed of as in criminal cases. (8a)

Section 10. Court may release respondent. – The court which issued the order imprisoning a person for contempt may discharge him from imprisonment when it appears that public interest will not be prejudiced by his release. (9a)

Section 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay. – The judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in criminal cases. But execution of the judgment or final order shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by the person adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed by the court from which the appeal is taken, conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or final order. (10a)

Section 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. – Unless otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall apply to contempt committed against persons, entities, bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall have suppletory effect to such rules as they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by law to punish for contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction over such charges as may be filed therefor.